

UNITED STATES ARMY  
**COMBAT FORCES**

*Journal*  
Infantry Journal •

Field Artillery Journal

DECEMBER 1952

50¢

"People's War" is guerrilla war—  
whether for good or evil

Our training emphasis is still misplaced  
—on the individual instead of the team

Storm Signals over NATO—the next  
few months will be meaningful.



**MAIL CALL IN KOREA**

# Too Many 'Administrative'?

A former rifle platoon leader in Korea shudders at the criticism he hears of the combat division's overhead

## Lt. Junior Officer

THE portion of the fortieth Lyndon Johnson subcommittee report directing fire at the Army seemed to concentrate on the infantry division, and the notion that too many are "administrative." Let's take a look.

There are 1,103 men (6 per cent) on noncombatant medical duties. These are the people who have helped reduce by 50 per cent the death rate among the wounded in action in Korea, under the World War II figures. They have made possible the return to duty of 85 per cent of the Korean wounded. Would any American civilian seriously propose a reduction of these men to save dollars and cents?

The Russians with their low regard for human life have far fewer medical men.

There are 248 men in a division's Quartermaster Company, handling supplies. Should our troops eat well or not? Or should they scrounge the countryside for unsanitary rations as the Red troops do?

There are 306 men in the Division Ordnance Company, few enough to keep our many combat vehicles and weapons rolling.

The 182 men of the division Military Police Company guard and process all prisoners of war, form straggler check points and control traffic. Soviet divisions have no MPs. They have small regard for prisoners and often shoot any soldier inclined to straggle.

Our division has a band (43 men) for morale, 37 in a replacement company to keep a flow of new men moving up. There are a few chaplains and their assistants—not found at all in the Red Armies.

Does Senator Johnson or anyone else seriously propose that we emulate the Soviet forces by reducing or eliminating any of the units?

And what about communications personnel? The Johnson report seemed to indicate that the Soviet infantry, with fewer, must somehow be more efficient.

In Korea, the company in which I was a platoon commander, was making an attack upon an enemy objective at dawn. Our advance would carry us over 1,500 yards of open ground before we reached a place where we could assault the enemy's positions. We would have to cross this open ground in the morning light and we were expecting heavy enemy mortar and artillery fire.

We moved to our objective in an open company column to facilitate control in the difficult terrain of the rice fields. Headway was slow. For a long while we were exposed but no rounds came our way until we began our assault. And then a

terrific concentration of mortar and artillery fire began to fall, out in the open area we had left behind us.

We took our first objective and then the enemy's mortar positions. The mortars were still there, with ammunition for them. It was plain that there had been no wire or radio communication between their mortar crews and front-line infantry. They had depended on messengers alone.

If we had been in this same situation, we would have slaughtered the enemy. One brief telephone call would have had mortar and artillery fire on the way and subsequent calls would have adjusted that fire and kept it on the enemy.

IN our tables of organization we count a runner as a messenger. Is there anyone on Mr. Johnson's subcommittee or elsewhere who will stand up and tell me that runners don't fight?

Once we were on a hill about to go through a village. The enemy was in a house about fifty yards to our front. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher team was getting ready to fire a round into the house to take care of that particular group. The rocket misfired. One of those split-second changes that combat requires was now needed. I jumped up to change the maneuver plan and sniper bullets began to fly in my direction. Bang, bang, went answering shots. My messenger took good care of the sniper.

That same messenger was my radio operator. Whenever we sent out a squad patrol he went with it and kept me in contact by radio. Once a patrol that he was with was caught in the middle of an open field by enemy fire. By radio I ordered the patrol to withdraw. As they did I saw a man fall. My messenger ran back up through the open area to aid the stricken man. He carried him, his weapon, his own weapon and radio to safety all under heavy fire.

In every situation my messenger's rifle contributed as much firepower as any other rifleman's and he wasn't an exceptional messenger. He was just one of thousands who do their jobs well. In the end he was killed. Do I hear anybody say that messengers aren't fighters? Or that we have too many communications people? When battle comes we seldom have enough.

And who says the company clerk doesn't fight? I know many with scars of combat.

Personnel clerks? They may not fight much as long as they stick to their assigned jobs. But when casualties reduced one company of my regiment to some thirty-odd and

no replacements were to be had, our regimental commander sent up some personnel clerks. Paper work bogged down (many records are confused to this day) but we kept a rifle company in the fight.

Paper work may be a nuisance in combat, but Americans demand prompt casualty reports. They don't want to wait until a war is over to find out what happened to a loved one, and then, as in the Red Army, perhaps never find out. The American people also believe in just protection for those who receive disabilities in combat.

IS the first sergeant a fighter or an administrator? I saw one reorganize his company after an enemy breakthrough and with his pistol blazing lead his outfit back to retake their position. The deeds of first sergeants are long and valorous.

Unit administrators? One night during a heavy enemy attack we fired all our ammunition—four bandoleers per man and seven boxes per machine gun. Our unit administrator organized hand-carry parties from a few messengers and truck drivers and led them up to the platoons through heavy mortar fire. This man would never take a commission, but when the officer casualties got heavy he led a platoon. Another in our regiment ended up commanding a company.


And I know many a cook who has fought to save his kitchen, and some who fought through roadblocks to get the chow to their troops. Hot cooked meals heighten morale.

Drivers? Trucks and good drivers mean mobility. One day in Korea we would be on one section of the line at dusk. At daybreak next day we would be on another many miles from the first one.

Vehicles often saved our battalion—brought up aid when we needed it. We held 13,000 yards of front and the enemy hit us hard. The battalion couldn't have held if another hadn't come up by truck. That battalion had just killed 3,000 enemy before sundown on the day that they came to join us. Good trucks and good drivers were all that made such moves possible.

Let's go mighty slow on cutting down any of these elements. A clear case can be made that reduction of any of them will not only add to casualties but tend to close the gap between our powerful, flexible American division and the far less powerful and less efficient divisions of the Red Army. We can improve our fighting units, always; but never by hasty reduction of numbers as numbers.

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
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COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



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### Teach 'em How to Shoot

To the Editors:

In reference to the rate of fire of a light machine gun, it is my feeling that we put out volume enough with our present guns, both light and heavy, and that for the jobs we use it for—buttoning up pillboxes bunker embrasures, and enemy troops en masse—we need no further increase in rate of fire. All of us are getting to the point where we don't aim at a specific target but just open up, empty our clip or magazine, and feel like hell when the enemy keeps right on coming, particularly when we have rattled off all the ammo on the position.

Let's keep the rate slowed down, teach men how to shoot, and we will kill a few instead of scaring them and making a nervous wreck of the S4 who is having a bad time trying to keep the ammo coming up.

As to our use of the machine gun I feel that anyone who has watched the guns go into position in Korea, both on the offense and the defense, needs no further comment on its use. The FPL just can't be used on those razor-backs, and if one is foolhardy enough to put the guns in on low ground, guns, gunners, and ammo carriers aren't around the next morning!

Major Claggett has put some fine dope in "What Good is a Machine Gun?" [October issue]. The "school solution" may not be entirely discarded when the Big War comes along, but it can surely stand a lot of revising and revamping to stay up with the current situation.

MAJ. GERALD P. AVERILL  
USMC

Junior School  
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Quantico, Va.

### Relearn "To the Hills, Men"

To the Editors:

The present emphasis on taking to the hills in Korea must be one of those tactical lessons that have to be relearned from war to war. Consider the following quotation:

"In as much as in hilly country the routes naturally follow the course of valleys, and as habitations, cultivation, and level patches suitable for camps are generally found in depressions, regular troops engaged in operations in such theaters of war are, when not in immediate combat with the foe, practically compelled to remain on the lower ground. This is so whether they are on the move or at rest. The consequence is that the enemy occupies the crests of the hills which the army passes on the march, or which surround its bivouac when it comes to a halt. Hill-men moreover always retire to the

high ground when the troops advance against villages or show dispositions for a fight. As a result, what is technically known as 'crowning the heights' is at almost all times an essential part of any operation in hill warfare, and it can rarely be altogether dispensed with even when the troops are at rest. But although this principle is fully recognized nowadays, and although the precaution of occupying commanding ground whence hostile parties could inflict loss on the army below seems an obvious one to take, it is nevertheless a fact that the system has only of late years come to be adopted as a matter of course." (And so on for a number of pages.)

This is from *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* by Colonel C. E. Callwell, third edition, 1910; an official publication of the British War Office. The last printing was in 1914 when Great Wars came in and Police Actions were not called that.

JOHN FOUNTAIN

233 West 11th St.  
New York 14, N. Y.

### More Schooling

To the Editors:

Hardly a service journal is published these days without mention of Army personnel working with a combined staff, a Military Assistance Advisory Group, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters, United Nations teams, or other international duties. Duty with these organizations has become common, and most officers will probably serve with them during their service career.

The Army wants the best results from officers assigned these duties with our Allies. Just as we are trained for troop duty in the basic and advance courses at Benning, Sill, and other schools why shouldn't we be trained for these international political-military assignments?

Lieutenants, captains, and majors are serving with these various international units all over the world, and what they do easily affects political as well as military situations. So, why not train them for the duty at least briefly in the basic and advance courses, or even in regimental officer schools?

Such instruction could be one or two hours a week, and include such basic subjects as organization of the Military Defense Aid Program, duty with combined staffs, geopolitics of vital areas, current affairs, as directly affect the military, organization of allied armies, and other facets of our world-wide Army with its many assignments.

The Army school system is very inclusive; certainly one or two hours a week

**COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL**

# THE FAMOUS L-4 GETS A WORTHY SUCCESSOR



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2nd Lt.  
Joseph C. Rodriguez  
U.S. Army  
Medal of Honor

**SIXTY YARDS TO GO.** From atop the hill, near Munye-ri, Korea, the enemy suddenly opened up a withering barrage. The squad was caught; Red mortars began zero-ing for the kill. Lieutenant Rodriguez (then Pfc., with only seven months service) broke loose and dashed up the fire-swept slope, throwing grenades. Disregarding the fire concentrated on him, he wiped out three foxholes and two gun emplacements. Alone, he accounted for 15 enemy dead, led the rout of the enemy, and saved the lives of his squad.



"When you have to take chances to reach an objective, that's O.K.," says Lieutenant Rodriguez. "But when you can find a surer way to reach your goal, so much the better.

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covering a duty we will probably be involved in would be useful.

CAPT. DILLON SNELL

Tactical Dept.  
The Infantry School  
Fort Benning, Ga.

### *Dangerous Labels*

To the Editors:

I have just finished reading your editorial, "One Artillery," in the October issue. Your broad accusation of "foot-dragging" can and should be resented by every thinking artilleryman. Is a man a foot-dragger just because he honestly opposes change? Is a man a "radical" because he proposes a change? Let's be fair and sensible. If any individual has actually and actively tried to subvert or delay the integration program after it was ordered and authorized by Congress, then he should be disciplined. I know of no such person at this station.

But let's maintain our right to voice our opinions on any subject without being classed as reactionary foot-draggers or radicals. This attitude kills initiative and dampens our desires to be vocal.

LT. COL. THOMAS A. HARRIS

Arty

Dept. of Motors  
The Artillery School  
Fort Sill, Okla.

• Our label "foot dragging" was addressed to those who are not "actually and actively [trying] to subvert or delay" but have given less than wholehearted effort to push the integration. It is a matter of degree and who can draw a line that says this is foot dragging, this is active opposition, and this is wholehearted acceptance? We encourage the voicing of opinion and stand fast in believing our magazine is a valid forum for the expression of opinion by both "reactionaries" and "radicals."

### *What's a Soldier?*

To the Editors:

I started this letter to suggest that marines should be included in your listing of "Soldiers" who have received the Medal of Honor.

Then, knowing the sharp-pencilled attitude of the editors, I figured I'd better find out what "soldier" meant before I let loose.

A soldier, according to my Webster, is one engaged in military service. Military, again according to Webster, comes from *millia passum*, a thousand paces—what a good soldier (or marine) should take in his stride, combat loaded. Few sailors or airmen could walk a thousand paces in any craft they are now using, so that pretty well brings the soldier and marine to the same footing.

But, on the other hand, a "soger" in sea language is one who shirks work—obviously derived from the days when troops aboard ship loafed while the sailors toiled.

But, on the other hand, the word soldier comes from *solidus*—a piece of money, indicating that soldiers were once paid in



**HISTORY IN THE MAKING**—When two big Sikorsky H-19s landed at Wiesbaden, Germany, on August 4, following a multi-stage flight across the Atlantic Ocean, a new chapter was added to aviation history.

To the Air Rescue Service, which conducted the flight this was an important proof of the ability of helicopters to operate on long-range missions. The test was made under severe weather conditions where the skill of pilots

and the performance of both of the aircraft were heavily taxed.

The successful completion of this historic flight was a major step in the evolution of the helicopter . . . already a craft of unparalleled usefulness and versatility. And it hastened the day when big helicopters of the future will be available to fly anywhere in the world, to perform their multitude of useful services.

## SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

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ONE OF THE FOUR DIVISIONS OF UNITED AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

solid money. And why were they paid in money? Because in Roman days they were mercenaries—coming from the word *merces*, meaning something traded (soldiers traded fighting for money). And what does that lead to? Combat pay, naturally. If a soldier is trading his sweat-earned ability for something, he'd be foolish not to trade it for gold.

I don't know what all this adds up to, except that maybe marines should be included in the Medal of Honor listing in the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL*—and that both soldiers and marines should get the same (or more) combat pay as airmen.

LT. RIGHTER

Madrid, Spain

#### Marine on Bataan

To the Editors:

I received the surprise of my life when on page 35 of the October 1952 issue I recognized the photograph of a very dear friend. He is the man depicted in the photograph at the top of the page with the open wound in his right arm.

If my memory serves me correctly, this man is Corporal Steven Kozuck, U.S. Marine Corps, and he received the bullet wound which, through the setting in of gas gangrene, necessitated the opening of his arm as illustrated. I might add that Corporal Kozuck received this wound in the engagement with the Japanese on Ba-



"Wounded on Bataan"

ataan; the bullet striking his right forearm on the inside and passing along the bone and out the elbow while holding his rifle to his shoulder firing at the Japanese who shot him. Corporal Kozuck, even though hit, continued to fire, killing the Japanese who wounded him. Corporal Kozuck would not leave his unit to receive aid for his wound until forced by the pain and smell of gangrene. Upon arrival at the hospital near Mariveles, the opening of Kozuck's arm was accomplished with no anaesthetic. Corporal Kozuck was again with me as a POW and was killed by a Japanese machine gun while we were in the act of escaping from Camp 10A, Palawan, Philippine Islands.

I have often thought of this brave lad and would appreciate any help you can

give in verifying that the photograph in your magazine is of Corporal Kozuck. I would also like to obtain a copy of the actual photograph for my personal album.

Lt. D. W. Bogue

611 Monterey Drive  
Oceanside, Calif.

• We obtained the photograph early in 1942 from Time-Life, Inc., although their name does not appear on it. Nor does Corporal Kozuck's. The only notation is "Wounded on Bataan." We are glad to give the original to Lieutenant Bogue.

#### Teamwork

To the Editors:

As an ardent student of ground combat, I was interested in "Three Regimental Commanders in Korea" by Major W. C. Bryan in the September issue.

About sixty or seventy years ago a man named J. Mason Knox set down a real evaluation of teamwork and I guess Colonel Charlie must be one of his boys. It is too bad we don't have more of them. Maybe it would help to print the memorable words:

"It is not the guns or armament  
or the money they can pay,  
It's the close cooperation  
that makes them win the day.  
It is not the individual  
or the Army as a whole.  
But the everlasting teamwork  
Of every bloomin' soul."

ROBERT L. KUEHN

TUSNG-JAMMAT  
Golcuk, Izmit, Turkey

#### Don't Kid Them

To the Editors:

"Psywar In Korea" by Lieutenant Dale Story in your July issue mentions enemy propaganda as indicting Americans' as "indiscriminate bombers . . . brutal users of napalm and . . . Koreans." Lieutenant Story feels this is an injustice.

As an armored veteran of the Pusan Perimeter, I would like to go on record as being a brutal user of napalm. Whatever the Air Force will deliver I'll use. Any Communist who doesn't believe this is making a big mistake.

Lt. ARMOR

New York, N. Y.

#### Rating Procedure

To the Editors:

I consider the *COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL* a must for all infantry officers because it is an invaluable source of information which every officer needs. After reading Lt. Col. Fellenz's article "How Efficient is Our Efficiency Report?" in the August issue, I can't resist the temptation to tell about my experiences as a rating officer.

In 1947 I was rated by a colonel who called me into his office and told me how he was rating me and why. Since then I have followed this procedure. Not only

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have I noticed the same reaction as that of the field grade officer mentioned in the article, but I observed a marked improvement in the proficiency of the officer rated. Whatever the reasons are for not letting an officer know how he stands among his group, the failure to get the best out of that officer is not the best utilization of manpower. Our Army deserves the best of each officer.

**MAJ. LUCIUS E. YOUNG**  
Infantry

Hq, 370th Armored Inf. Bn  
APO 46, c/o PM  
New York, N. Y.

### Rangers in Korea

To the Editors:

As a former Ranger, I should like to express my deep concern over their fate. Their deactivation was the deepest disappointment of my Army service. In two tours of Korean combat duty, I have yet to find an American unit that could begin to equal the spirit of determination, aggressiveness, pride and comradeship displayed by the Rangers.

Although the Department of the Army did publish an explanation for the Rangers' deactivation, it was little publicized, and I have heard many conflicting views. I cannot help but feel that the Department of the Army owes it to the fine men who suffered and died in Korea as members of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 8th Ranger companies to provide a clear, concise and well publicized explanation for the deactivation of these fine units. If such an explanation is not possible, perhaps you could publish an account of the brief, but bloody history of the Rangers in Korea.

I hope you will help correct any impression that the Rangers were a failure. Nothing could be further from the truth.

**CPL. RICHARD D. ELLMERS**

3d Recon Co, 3d Inf. Div.  
APO 468, c/o PM  
San Francisco

### Find Something Wrong!

To the Editors:

"This rifle's dirty, soldier."

"Yes, sir."

"See down that barrel? See that speck about halfway down?"

"Yes, sir. I see."

"Well, take it back to the barracks and clean it. Bring it to me in the orderly room before you ask for your pass."

Back to the barracks goes the weary soldier. Weary, that is, of the harassment. However, he has been in the Army long enough. He is reconciled. So, he goes to the barracks. Hits the sack. Smokes. Watches the others take off for town. Then, just before the deadline for Lieutenant Perrybingle to leave the area, he takes his rifle to the orderly room. Lieutenant P inspects it minutely, especially the offending barrel.

"Hmm, that's better, Tackleton. You may draw your pass now."

"Yes, sir. Thank you, sir."

Of course, you have seen this little drama (comedy?) more than once. The pitiful (humorous?) part of it is that the rifle has not been touched since Lieutenant Perrybingle first inspected it.

Why?

I don't know.

Generally speaking, the purpose of inspections of arms and/or equipment is to determine that each man has his assigned arm and/or equipment, and that they are in good repair, clean and workable. Or so I thought. This seems to have been changed, in some cases, to the establishment of a certain norm. Five (or ten) per cent of the arms of a given unit will be dirty; ninety (or eighty) per cent will be passable; and five (or ten) per cent will be clean. With this yardstick five (or ten) per cent of the men will be gigged. More will be gigged if dirt is actually found.

There once was a senior army instructor who visited a unit. He watched a group of trainees being taught TO MARCH TO THE REAR. The sergeant in charge had explained, demonstrated, and pulled out for personal supervision members of the group who could not execute the movement. All could now do TO THE REAR after the fashion of recruits everywhere.

The sergeant had appointed one of the better men in the class as drillmaster. The weather was bad so the drill was held inside a building. There were no more than ten paces to spare from wall to wall. The sergeant was letting the tyro drillmaster have it. He did not interrupt with corrections or suggestions. The boy had all he could do to get the troops turned before they ran into the wall. He needed no coaching from the sergeant. He needed only to concentrate on what he was trying to do. Nor did the troops need:

"You're out of step, Gillespie."

"Don't swing your arms when you turn, Swinburne."

"Pivot on your left foot, Caleb."

They had all they could do to keep in step and spin to the right about on command. So the sergeant sensibly kept his big mouth shut. After the troops were halted he corrected the men—and the drillmaster.

All this is the background for the senior army instructor's criticism of the class.

"It is a good class [that preface is to ease the pain of what is to follow] but, the sergeant should have been correcting the men as they marched."

Now I ask you, is that constructive, deserved criticism or is it that plain old harassment?

**M/SGT. JACK ACLIN, JR.**  
Co E 117th Inf., TNG  
Paris, Tennessee

• The Editors don't think inspections are often conducted by conscious or unconscious harassers. But it may happen at times and so we sympathize with Sergeant Acclin and wish for his sake and ours that all men were perfect.

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# People's War

**Lieutenant Colonel Edward A. Raymond**

**M**ARX and Lenin called guerrilla warfare "people's underground war"; Stalin has called it "Stalin warfare," "underground envelopment," and "the fourth dimension of war." Guerrilla warfare is defined by many authorities as

LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD A. RAYMOND, Artillery, is on duty in the office of Chief of Psychological Warfare, Department of the Army. During World War II he served in the field artillery section, Allied Forces Headquarters, Mediterranean Theater of Operations.

*Clandestine radios are essential items of guerrilla equipment. This World War II Russian partisan is operating a sending set outside of Leningrad.*



operations carried out by small independent forces, generally in the rear of the enemy, with the objective of harassing, delaying and disrupting his military operations. The potential of guerrilla warfare is infinitely greater than that.

At the end of 1949, China, the most populous nation in the world, had been seized from within by overgrown guerrilla warfare. On the Eastern Front, in the last two years of World War II, Soviet and Polish partisans engaged more Nazi divisions on the German lines of communication than were deployed on the so-called front. Guerrilla forces under Tito freed Yugoslavia from Axis occupation. In Greece in 1947-1949, Communist guerrilla forces threatened the existence of the central government. In Indochina guerrilla forces threaten to seize the state. In each of these cases, guerrilla warfare played a major role, far beyond "harassing and delaying," and more far-reaching than the term "disrupting" implies.

One important characteristic is found in each case: the margin of victory was provided by a powerful, outside supporting power. Chinese forces first received American aid, then our Soviet ally transferred to the Communists captured Japanese arms. Partisan forces behind German lines on the Eastern Front in World War II used munitions left behind by retreating Red Army forces, or, exceptionally, flown in from unoccupied regions. British and American seaborne and airborne logistical support turned the tide of battle in Yugoslavia. The Soviet satellites supported Greek Com-



*In Indochina, an exhausted Viet Minh partisan captured by the French is held for questioning by staff officers.*

munist guerrillas and Communist China supports the forces of Ho Chi-minh in Indochina.

The harassing, delaying and disrupting mission may be appropriate for guerrilla forces in a secondary situation, but does not measure the full potential of this form of warfare under optimum conditions. The ultimate aim of guerrilla warfare, as of all warfare, is to defeat the enemy. In its truest form, guerrilla warfare is civil war—insurrection against a regime—with participating units growing in size and evolving into full-scale conventional armies and forcing the existing government or occupy-

*In the guerrilla's manual of tactics, sabotage is a favored instrument. Here*



Guerrilla warfare is a "people's war"—whether the aims are for good or evil. But the full power of guerrillas cannot be exerted without the help of a powerful outside supporting power.

ing power to withdraw.

The support of an external friendly power is required if the potential of guerrilla warfare is to be fully exploited. Missions of a particular guerrilla force, both strategic and tactical, must be based on the objectives of the outside supporting power.

The pages of history are red with the blood of unsuccessful revolts. Guerrillas can see all too plainly how few arms they have, how little ammunition. Food and transport are constant problems, and much of the energies of fighting units must be expended in staying alive. Shortages of medical supplies and the difficulty or impossibility of evacuating and hospitalizing casualties are a severe drain upon morale.

*Yugoslav partisans blew the tracks and derailed a Nazi troop train.*



*Guerrillas can wage active warfare when the prospects of linking up with the invading army are bright. Members of the French Underground brought out long-bidden weapons on the eve of the Allied invasion of Southern France in 1944.*

To fight on for years against overwhelming odds requires a form of fanaticism. As a drowning man clutches at a straw, guerrillas seize upon outside assistance. The idea of outside support is immensely enheartening. There is a danger that it may cause too much enthusiasm, give rise to too ambitious a program and outstrip the possible. A greater danger lies in not realizing the price which must be paid for outside support. There may be too little national feeling; regional loyalties, the personal ambitions of leaders, political differences or religious schisms may obstruct the purposes of the outside power or powers. The royalist Mikhailovitch and the Communist Tito fought each other in Yugoslavia. More tragic was the effort of the Polish Home Army to free Warsaw from German occupation as the Soviet Army approached from the east in 1944. The Soviets delayed their attack and an estimated 100,000 lives were sacrificed, most of them needlessly. In World War II in Greece, there was bitter political competition among the partisans of ELAS, EDES and EAM.

**T**HE mission of guerrillas in a strongly occupied country must be wedded to the mission of the outside supporting power. If the supporting power plans an early invasion, the guerrillas must conduct their operations so as to attract a minimum of attention. Bands of guerrillas should not lay a paper-chase

trail of leaflets, posters or publications, although such activity may be conducted by static noncombatant formations, dissociated from the field forces. Widespread sabotage, nuisance raids and terrorism attract too much attention, like a dog with firecrackers tied to his tail. This may seem obvious but certain Allied headquarters in the Second World War, charged with the coordination of

*Guerrilla sabotage can help an invading army. In 1944 the French Resistance harassed the German rear, destroying his lines of communication.*



behind-the-lines activity, had a number of interested staff sections. Each section tried to keep its particular ball in the air all the time.

A secondary guerrilla mission in the situation of a friendly invasion impending may be a coordinated military effort for tactical advantage in landing areas or drop zones.

From February to May, 1944, the French Resistance placed top priority on preparing for the Normandy landings. In this situation there were sufficiently large French forces in the area to permit preliminary sabotage. Just before the landings and during their execution, a full-scale campaign was conducted on communications and isolated troop units. These operations (plus the aerial campaign) prevented six German divisions from reaching the battlefields of Normandy during the critical period of 6 June to 26 July 1944. German heavy armored units, forced to move by road instead of rail, arrived in the battle area too late and too disorganized to fight. General Eisenhower estimated the value of the French guerrilla forces to be equivalent to fifteen Allied divisions.

THE early Communist theorists, Karl Marx and V. I. Lenin, paid particular attention to the struggles of the Spanish population against Napoleon, the Austrian campaigns in Italy and also to the Franco-German War. They popularized the concept of the People's Underground War.

In their studies they tried to find out how an organized popular movement, without proper arms, can be led to fight with any hope of success against highly organized and well-equipped armies. F. O. Miksche, in his interesting study, *Secret Forces*, points out that the Franco-Spanish War was exceptionally enlightening. French forces of considerable size for their time—some 670,000 men and 520 guns—crossed the Pyrenees between 1807 and 1813 to conquer Spain. Only 250,000 men and 250 guns returned to France. Allied victory in the Middle East, in Mesopotamia and Palestine in the First World War, was won with the help of the Arab free rangers, under the semi-legendary Colonel T. E. Lawrence.

Lawrence's significance is that he largely destroyed the Turkish forces and gave us new concepts of guerrilla strategy. While the Arabs were more mobile but less able to bear casualties than orthodox armies, the Turks were almost uninterested in loss of men, though not in loss of matériel, of which they were short. Superb at sitting tight in a trench or firing at a directly oncoming target, they could neither adapt themselves to, nor endure, the strain of fluid operations. Lawrence seized on that weakness by destroying railroad equipment, thus paralyzing the Turks.

When invasion by an outside supporting power is not imminent, the strategic mission of the guerrillas is served by distinctly different tactical means.

The primary tactical mission in this situation may be psychological warfare, with the objective of maintaining hope of eventual liberation and overcoming unreasoned fear of the occupying power. Acts which will foster widespread reprisals on the part of the enemy are to be avoided. Under the cloak of apparent

*Propaganda is a prime weapon of guerrillas. This collection of posters and attack plans were captured by the Dutch from insurgent Indonesians.*





collaboration, slowdowns are encouraged, not only to hamper the enemy, but to show people that they are not helpless; that united they are strong. All appropriate methods of communication are utilized, but in most situations, leaflets or the clandestine press will be the most effective. "Ideas," writes Brigadier McLean of the British Army, "are more important to guerrillas than bullets."

Outside headquarters should be aware of the risks run by guerrillas, not only in obtaining information, but in transmitting it as well. Requirements should be limited to data which actually will be used, and not merely ornament files and grow obsolete before they are needed. For example, if biographical information on minor, routine figures in the occupying forces is woven into broadcasts, it can be considered to have been used; but a further screening of requirements is needed to ensure that the effect attained justifies the collection effort.

Resistance in the Balkans led to classic examples of guerrilla warfare in the high mountains. Very primitive and poorly equipped at the start, the resistance organization improved to such an extent that towards the end of the war it had almost attained the standard of a regular army. Whereas in the spring of 1941 the Germans required only twenty divisions to destroy the Yugoslav and Greek armies within a few days, the subsequent occupation and policing of the countries required fifteen German and thirty Italian, Bulgarian and Croatian divisions. Territories the size of Belgium were governed by Yugoslav partisans. Documents found in the possession of the Chief of the Press Bureau of the Supreme Command of the German Army reveal that the German losses in killed in the Balkans amounted to 24,000 as compared with only 12,000 in Africa.

**W**HEN the supporting power does not envision an invasion, but wishes guerrillas to contain the maximum number of occupying troops and deny the enemy logistical support, appropriate tactical missions alter. Here they can be described adequately as harassing, delaying and disrupting.

In view of the indefinite protraction of guerrilla activity in this situation, psychological warfare again plays a foremost part. When armed action is imminent a sense of accomplishment and progress maintains enthusiasm. When there is no liberation in sight, when the battle against tremendous odds goes on indefinitely, the climate for noncooperation and sabotage is hard to maintain.

It is in this situation that widely scat-



*A People's War enlists both sexes and all ages. These grenade-carrying lasses were members of the French Resistance. They performed as guides and scouts.*

tered acts of terrorism are appropriate, from the guerrilla point of view. The Communist-inspired Hukbalahaps have greatly retarded the postwar development of the Philippines and have tied up large government forces. Communist Chinese guerrillas in Malaya have interfered with the economic rehabilitation of the country and forced Great Britain to use large military and police forces in Malaya.

**C**ONFLICT between the government and communist-led and communist-supported guerrillas broke out shortly after the liberation of Greece and for four years threatened to dislocate completely the economic and political life of the country. The communists gained complete control of the northern border areas of Greece and were supplied by the communist nations of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which in turn were supported by the USSR. Within these areas, regular communist military forces were organized. Additional forces waged guerrilla warfare in other sectors of Greece. Only after large-scale economic and military assistance from the United States was the Greek Government able to overcome the communist forces.

The Indonesians, who had never accepted Dutch control, openly resisted Dutch efforts to reoccupy the country at the end of the war and effectively denied a large part of the country to the Dutch military forces. As a result,

the Netherlands government granted virtual independence to the area.

Today Indochina is in danger, and at least 150,000 good French troops are tied down there.

**R**ESISTANCE movements are of a predominantly political character and political factors must be considered with great care by an outside supporting power. There is a high premium on picking a winner among rival resistance factions. Allied strategy in Yugoslavia, though fraught with controversy then and now, provides an excellent illustration of this type of difficulty. The support given to Tito's followers in Yugoslavia was a factor in causing the Catholic Croatian Ustachi to support the Nazis. Another extremely serious political consideration is the postwar effect of guerrilla warfare.

Normal warfare has for its object the destruction of the opposing army in battle; aerial attacks demolish the adversary's industrial centers and cities. But the "People's Underground War" destroys the soul of a nation, systematically leading it into disobedience and disrespect of law and order. As in all revolutions, the "People's War" means complete chaos, a savage struggle in which the end justifies the means, and vengeance, trickery, and even treachery, play a great part. Each action provokes a reaction, and the consequent reprisals engender hatred.



*Guerrillas usually find weapons hard to come by. This Soviet photograph is said to show Russian partisans repairing weapons in a behind-the-German-lines machine shop arsenal.*

The question of political commitments is a major one. Normally, firm political commitments are made in advance. Lawrence of Arabia promised the Arabs their independence. When it did not materialize, resentment festered in Arabian bosoms.

External propaganda efforts may have some political effect. These should fight xenophobic tendencies in the guerrilla forces. German attitudes towards the Italians were so arrogant and overbearing that many Italian soldiers joined the *partigiani* in their successful resistance movement in northern Italy in 1944-45.

Native leaders who have been trained outside the resisting country are of great value in ensuring harmony of viewpoint after the conclusion of a campaign. The Lenin Institute in Moscow trained Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Peter Dimitrov, Ana Pauker, Josip Broz (Tito), and others.

Continuous external support is of great importance, and should include tactical and technical liaison, delivery of arms, ammunition, explosives and sup-

plies demanded by the tactical situation.

In 1937 Mao Tse-tung wrote a remarkable treatise on guerrilla warfare. Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, has made an English translation of this little-known but important volume. Mao concludes his treatise in the following manner:

"Historical experience is written in blood and iron. We must point out that the guerrilla campaigns being waged in China today are a page in history that has no precedent. Their influence will not be confined solely to China but will be world wide."

When Mao Tse-tung wrote these words, observes Colonel Griffith, "he commanded a communist guerrilla army which the Japanese considered as an essentially unimportant collection of tattered bandits. Mao now rules a nation of 460 million people. He is the chief architect of a strategy designed to repeat the communist triumph in China all over Asia."

Mao likens guerrillas to fish. "The people are the water in which the fish swim. If the temperature of the water is right, the fish will multiply and flourish," he said. Military raids into enemy territory, like those of Morgan and Early in our Civil War, did not have the benefit of support from the local population—the "temperature was not right." Anti-Communist powers controlled the water in which the communist fish were swimming in Greece and Indonesia. Can it be done in time of war in communist-held territory? In the Soviet Union, the German invaders were greeted as liberators

in 1941 and two million Red Army men deserted. This does not prove that any such number would desert to a conventional invasion force today, but it does indicate their true feelings about Stalin. There are other indications. When forced repatriation of displaced persons from Germany was suspended after World War II, very few of the hundreds of thousands remaining were willing to go back to the USSR. Many citizens of the Soviet Union have risked their lives to escape from despotism and reach the West.

**D**ISCONTENT in the satellite states is hard to measure; although the number of defections to the West is many times as high, opportunities to escape are greater than for Soviet citizens. Chou En-lai himself is the authority for a 1950 estimate that there were no fewer than 250,000 "bandits" in Communist China.

"Mao Tse-tung," writes Colonel Griffith, "has basically revised the theory of 'The People's War,' sired so long ago by Karl Marx. All students of guerrilla war, including at one time Mao Tse-tung himself, have believed in the past that guerrillas by themselves can never win through to final victory; they can never be but a complement to regular forces fighting at the front. But Mao Tse-tung proved in China that guerrillas, given the support of a great power, and given modern techniques of communications and supply, can themselves be transformed into regular forces. They may then win total victory."

*Homemade bombs and land mines are a most valuable asset to guerrillas. These two Red Chinese guerrillas display a land mine used by Mao's forces.*



# Crisis in Manpower

*In a year when the Army's need for skilled manpower is critical, it will lose about half of its experienced soldiers and train 750,000 new men*

**Gen. J. Lawton Collins**

**T**HERE is a danger that the nation might become so enthralled by machines and weapons systems that we may lose sight of the fact that man—the individual soldier—is the supreme element in combat. Despite all our scientific advances, our nation must realize fully that wars are still won by men fighting on the ground. Korea reaffirmed this truth. It proved once again that it takes men in position on the ground to prevent an aggressor from moving.

I should like to re-emphasize—and I say this without any intention of decrying the tremendous importance of the other services—that the Army's role, as in the past, is ultimately the decisive one. As I have said many times, in my judgment, air power will have a more important role in future war than ever before. I do not differentiate between naval air power and Air Force power; I mean total air power. But, nevertheless, the ultimate and decisive role is played by military forces on land.

The ground soldier to whom we confide this grave responsibility for final victory or defeat, this man who meets the enemy in face-to-face combat, must be first class. Combat records and casualty lists prove that the Army's role in warfare is the most dangerous, the most exacting, the most crucial test of man's physical, mental, and moral strength. Second-class manpower has never made a first-class Army, and we dare not entrust our American youth and our nation's security to second-raters.

The most precious commodity with which the army deals is the individual soldier who is the heart and soul of our combat forces, particularly the Infantry. If the battalion, company, platoon, and squad leaders of infantry are not skilled in the business of leading troops in action, and if they do not possess top-flight qualities of leadership, the direct consequence is the unwarranted loss of life and perhaps loss of the battle.

Since there is no counterpart in civil life for the profession of arms, the Army

must select its combat leaders from the best qualified personnel available. My experience has been that among our non-professional soldiers, the best leaders come from all walks of life and are invariably men who are used to making decisions and to accepting responsibility—two of the essential prerequisites for Army command. Many have had engineering or other technical training and experience.

Having made my plea to you for a better understanding of the Army's needs for top-flight manpower, let me mention an additional problem which is typical of those which face an army of a democracy.

**Y**OUR Army today is a going concern with more than 700,000 men—almost half of our personnel—overseas. They are on assignments of critical importance to our national safety and to the security of the entire free world.

We have six divisions committed in Korea against a vicious enemy and five more in Europe where they are potentially subject to attack with little or no warning. In all, we have a total of 13 divisions overseas which must be supported with men and matériel. Otherwise they cannot do their jobs.

We have seven divisions here at home upon which we depend for the necessary operation of our rotation program. Unless we have divisions, regiments, and battalions to conduct unit training and to fit our soldiers for their places in our combat teams, then we cannot provide the thousands of replacements which are needed every month to support our present rotation program.

This difficult problem is made even more serious by the fact that we are inducting new men and releasing veterans at such a rate that during this year the Army will turn over about half of its personnel; and we will have to receive and train almost three-quarters of a million new men. This rapid turnover presents a tremendous problem. What

would the average business and professional man think if he were suddenly asked to release half of his trained employees in less than one year's time—workers, accountants, skilled technicians and the like—and to hire new personnel, train them, and, at the same time, still continue to conduct an efficient, economical operation? That is exactly what we must do this year.


Many of these men whom we are losing are highly trained specialists and key combat leaders. Basic soldiers can be trained in a period of about four months, but we cannot do that with the noncommissioned officers or with the many highly skilled technical specialists which modern war requires. Their skills require not four months, but a year or more of intensive schooling.

Personnel in the lower grades are, for the most part, replaced by newly trained inductees, but the more highly trained and experienced replacements must come from the only available source, namely, from other units. The difficulty of providing sufficient numbers of them to support the rotation program is shown by the fact that thirteen divisions are stationed overseas while only seven are active here at home. Thus, in effect, each unit here in the United States, while losing its own personnel through separation, must train replacements for the personnel that are lost and, at the same time, supply replacements for two units overseas.

**T**ODAY, with so many advances being made in the mechanical tools of war, there is a tendency on the part of some to overemphasize the importance of machines and to underestimate the importance of man. But the true value and importance of these tools to defend our freedoms depend finally upon the skill, the courage, and the conviction of the men who use them. Men will always be more important than machines, and on the battlefield men have always determined the issue and always will.

These paragraphs are from an address by the Chief of Staff before the Carnegie Institute Society of Pittsburgh on 16 October





*Bradley and Ridgway meet in Paris.*

# Storm Warnings over NATO

## Squall or Hurricane?

**Colonel Buffet**

**S**TORM warnings that the press has hoisted over NATO would seem to give little hope for firm commitments for 1953 by the fourteen NATO nations. But storm warnings over NATO are nothing new, so an examination is in order to determine whether the storm is a squall or a hurricane.

All the current doubts and misgivings about NATO can be summarized in questions:

(1) Will the 1952 goals announced at Lisbon—fifty divisions and 4,000 front-line aircraft—be reached by the end of 1952?

(2) Will the military estimate of minimum needs—approximately ninety divisions by the end of 1954—be achieved? Are they realistic goals in the face of the economic and domestic political situations in the European nations?

(3) Will U. S. military aid be continued? How much? How much can the European nations do for themselves without U. S. aid? (These questions will plague our Congress and Europe's parliaments in the next few months.)

(4) Are the 1954 estimates of the Military Committee really valid or will atomic and other untried weapons decrease the need for forces for the defense of Western Europe?

(5) How can the European commanders make valid plans for defense when necessary information on atomic weapons is withheld from them and their planning staffs? Will U. S. laws be liberalized so that there can be realistic appraisals of the contribution of atomic weapons?

These difficult problems are the reasons for the storm signals. And certainly they will tax the initiative, understanding and cooperation of all nations. But the tempest may not be as heavy and the skies as dark as the questions themselves indicate.

Right now in Paris, the annual review of NATO military commitments and capabilities is in process. Experts from fourteen nations, headed by Lord Ismay, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Council, are listening to presentations of the armament programs, and the mili-

tary progress reports of each of the nations. From what they hear, the annual review committee will decide, in its own opinion, what each nation should be able to commit to NATO in 1953. In making this recommendation, each nation's productive and economic capacity is considered, as well as its military manpower. This same kind of survey was produced in the fall of 1951 by the Temporary Council Committee and its "three Wise Men," headed by U. S. Mutual Security Agency head, W. Averell Harriman.

In the review procedure, the committee may come up with a total of combat units that falls short of the minimum needs as established by the Chiefs of Staff of the fourteen nations. In Lisbon it was reported that a "flash estimate" of the economic-industrial capacities by the TCC totalled about ten per cent less in divisions and airplanes by 1954 than the Military Committee required. It was decided at that time to let the Military Committee goals stand—let them represent the minimum strength essential to

## The Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Europe

*Reviews Dutch troops at Amsterdam . . .*



*Calls on French President Auriol at the Elysee Palace . . .*



defense—while waiting to see what could be accomplished toward those goals in 1952.

The same problem is bound to arise again this year. There will be pressure from the economic advisers to scale down 1954 requirements to a more attainable figure. The U. S. "stretch-out of twelve to eighteen months for the combat forces originally planned by the end of 1954 will be quoted and also the United Kingdom's "stretch-out" of its rearmament.

If the goal is approximately 100 divisions by the end of 1954, with fifty divisions ready at the end of 1952, the 1953 goals should be about halfway, or seventy-five divisions. However, if it were decided that the goals could only be met economically by 1956, then the balance could be spaced over four years. This would fix the 1953 goals at one-fourth the balance, or in the neighborhood of twelve more divisions.

**T**HERE are indications that the annual review will not be ready for a December meeting. However, military men on both sides of the Atlantic are working hard on military answers that will be economically feasible, and politically acceptable to all of the NATO nations.

There are reasons to believe that it will be impossible to produce firm commitments of forces and equipment and dollars in December. The U. S. Secretaries of Defense and State, attending the meeting, will not be the men who will head the departments after January 20, 1953. Without firm commitments from the United States, especially on military aid, many of the European na-

tions will not be able to measure the extent of their 1953 contributions, either in fighting units, or in production. Present U. S. military aid funds are appropriated only until 1 July 1953, although large balances of still undelivered goods and dollars will continue to flow long past that date.

The United States has continued to press for a December meeting despite these obstacles because the U. S. delegates would like to give the President some indication of European efforts and capabilities. This would make it possible for the U. S. to prepare a soundly defensible budget for military aid.

Another reason for delaying firm commitments is that some European nations have said that largely increased commitments to NATO at this time will cause economic and political crises in their countries. Grave doubts about the ability of the United Kingdom to meet her commitments were reported, apparently quite accurately, early in the summer. The Prime Minister has since announced that the United Kingdom will come very close to meeting the 1952 commitments. However, the economic pressures will probably make continued rearmament effort a grave domestic political crisis in the United Kingdom, as well as a grave dollar problem in the whole sterling area.

Taking up the major problems in order, here is how it looks from a military viewpoint at this time.

### The 1952 Goals from Lisbon

At the end of October, it appeared that the NATO nations would be able

to raise all of the 25 active divisions, and almost all of the 25 "reserve" divisions scheduled for 1952. The reserve divisions are not the same as U. S. reserve units. In NATO, the reserve division is supposed to have approximately one-third of the division on active duty; the rest of the men, up to eighty-five per cent of strength, are assigned to units and living in the vicinity of the division headquarters; and the entire division is supposed to undergo at least two weeks, and preferably one month, of training in each calendar year. In Italy, this fall, the NATO maneuvers included a test of the "reserve" divisions, actually calling them to duty, and sending them north on maneuvers. Reports indicated that the system was quite successful.

In aircraft, the NATO forces will come very close to fulfilling the 1952 goal. It was estimated by one NATO official that there would be "no more than a 300 aircraft shortage," while others predicted that the full complement of 4,000 front-line aircraft would be in units in the NATO area.

### The 1954 Goals

The 1954 goals for NATO have never been officially announced. But it has been reported that the estimate is between 95 and 100 divisions, and approximately 7,000 front-line aircraft. Navy totals have seldom come into speculative consideration because the combined U. S.-British-French naval strength is considered sufficient to meet NATO and could be easily expanded if necessary.

It is quite apparent that these 1954 goals will not be reached unless drastic

*Watches French paratroopers in Germany...*



*Inspects Italian troops at Udine...*



changes in the international situation make necessary much more extensive mobilization by all nations. But the German contribution, which is estimated at approximately twelve divisions, could bring the NATO nations closer to a realization of the total.

Optimists point out that the German, Greek, and Turkish contributions almost total the balance between 1952 and 1954 goals. However, to offset these manpower gains is the fact that the addition of Greece and Turkey greatly enlarged the area NATO must defend. Although Greece and Turkey may not be able to give additional forces to the Supreme Commander for the defense of the center, the increased effectiveness of their forces may reduce the threat in the center.

Gauging the accomplishment by the "stretchout" in the United States and Great Britain, it would appear that the Military Committee requirements for 1954—if they are allowed to stand—will not be met until 1955 or 1956.

### United States Military Aid

Continued United States military aid to NATO is a touch-and-go problem of the new U.S. Congress. So far \$13,406 billions have been appropriated, which includes a program of \$621 millions from fiscal year 1952 appropriations for offshore procurement—buying military items in the NATO countries with American dollars. Congress will want to know how much the European nations can do for themselves without further U.S. aid, and how much longer the U.S. must give economic assistance.

Although there can be no official estimates of what the United States program will be for fiscal year 1954 (July 1, 1953 to June 30, 1954) at this time, previous testimony to Congress would indicate that it should continue to be about six billion dollars. If the military aid program, or the Mutual Assistance Program (as it is called, when it includes economic and Point 4 programs), is reduced considerably below the five billion dollar mark, the "stretchout" will be taut indeed.

### Atomic Weapons

Economic capability underlies all of the uncertainty about reaching the 1952, 1953, and 1954 goals. But there is another uncertainty—atomic weapons. Newspaper stories suggesting that the application of atomic weapons and other "super weapons" may reduce the size of the forces needed for the defense of Western Europe, have had heavy play in Europe. Since the stockpile of atomic bombs is held by the United States, only U. S. military planners are in a position to properly evaluate the results that can be expected of atomic weapons. Furthermore, the U.S. planners are the only ones who have any idea of how much of the atomic effort can be allocated to NATO, how much must be retained in reserve, and how much allocated to other efforts in the event of a third world war.

This is an awkward situation. It leads to wishful thinking and optimistic guesswork by those who get their information from the newspapers. Also, without the atomic factor, international military

planning is unrealistic. General Bradley directed a public statement on both these conditions at a press conference at SHAPE in September. He said in part:

"Recent speculation concerning the effect of atomic weapons on the defense of Europe has led to some international wishful thinking in regard to NATO requirements that we, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, believe could be misleading and dangerous. Optimistic estimates concerning the availability and effect of atomic weapons could mislead some nations into thinking that not all of the NATO forces planned for 1952-53-54 need be provided and trained. Such thinking would not be justified.

"General Ridgway and General Gruenther and some of the American members of their staff have access to 'restricted' data on atomic energy capabilities. In addition, all the public data on atomic energy matters and atomic weapons, including considerable civil defense information, are available to General Ridgway and all members of his international staff. Information on atomic weapons developments will continue to be integrated into NATO plans, and the forces to implement them, as progressively and rapidly as possible.

"In my opinion, with what we know now and what we can predict for the future, the forces presently scheduled for NATO are essential to the collective defense, even with optimistic estimates of the future capabilities of atomic weapons. The military committee estimate of requirements for ground and air forces is designed primarily to stop any initial aggression against the NATO

*Gets a look at Russia from Turkey...*



20

*Inspects Greek infantrymen at Salonika*



COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



area. These forces could not provide all the military strength essential to launch a counteroffensive or to win a possible war. This would call for a much more extensive mobilization.

"We must keep firmly in mind that atomic weapons are in various stages of development and that each kind would be available in a different quantity for use in the event of war. Therefore, it would be premature for any planners to attempt to substitute atomic weapons for sound balanced forces. Actually, no matter how many atomic weapons or bombs the collective NATO defense may eventually have on hand, there will always be a need for sufficient ground strength to force the enemy to concentrate for attack.

"In my opinion, no tested knowledge of atomic weapons to date indicates any reason to let up in our efforts to build up our collective security forces to at least those that we are planning for the next few years."

Later in the press conference, in response to a series of questions by the correspondents, General Bradley indicated that international military planning could be improved greatly if more knowledge of the atomic energy capability could be shared with the other NATO nations.

In answer to one question he said, "I believe all of us feel that, eventually, atomic weapons may—I shall repeat—may have some effect on force requirements, both as to numbers and as to the nature of units. But that is some time in the future. . . . certainly anything we can do within the next two or three years in

increasing our forces is still not going to be greater than our eventual requirements, even when you give full credit to the number of A-bombs and new weapons which may be available four or five years from now. . . ."

One questioner wanted to know how high officers at SHAPE who were not Americans can make plans when they don't have access to atomic information.

General Bradley answered: "Our Atomic Energy Act, passed by our Congress in 1946, put certain restrictions on information which we could give to anyone other than those United States personnel who are specially cleared to receive such information. That is a restriction placed on us by law, and so you will just have to trust the American members of your staffs on certain phases of it. . . ."

" . . . We hope to get that law changed some time, and that will permit us to divulge the information to selected members of Allied staffs. . . . When we do, your question will be fully answered. In the meantime, we will do the best we can."

General Bradley's statement that he favored increased technical information to other NATO military planners was received favorably in the United States and continental press.

**A**LL of these factors—the economic problem, and the application of new weapons—would indicate the need for a reappraisal of the over-all NATO strength and requirements. Such a reappraisal must be based on a sound intelligence estimate of the Soviet-satellite

capabilities both in conventional and in atomic weapons and our own knowledge of atomic energy capabilities. Meanwhile NATO military chiefs, including General Ridgway, support the view that whatever can be accomplished in the line of additional forces for 1953 will certainly be less than the minimum needed and that as great an effort as possible must be made in the next calendar year.


During September, senior United States officers and senior officers of other NATO nations observed the maneuvers which included the naval maneuver MAINBRACE, the two ground maneuvers HOLDFAST and EQUINOX, and the exercises in northern Italy. All of them returned with optimistic reports about the capabilities of the units already organized and the use they are making of the equipment being provided.

In response to a question, General Ridgway summed up the state of our Western defense in Europe as follows: "I think they are coming along as well as we can expect. There are many things left to be done. We are fully conscious of that. In the training field we can never be satisfied. We have many logistical problems to solve. The most reassuring feature of these maneuvers that I find is a recognition on the part of all concerned of what these shortcomings are and a determination to correct them as rapidly as we can."

Did that forecast a squall or a hurricane? Or a determination to batten down the hatches?

The answer will be apparent in the next few months.

#### *Visits British officials in London . . .*



(left to right: Adm. Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, First Sea Lord; Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Lord Alexander, Defense Minister; Gen. Ridgway; Air Marshal Sir John Slessor, Chief of the Air Staff)

#### *Meets Gen. Thomas T. Handy at Frankfurt.*






Figure 1. Azimuth and vernier scales installed on turret

## Hit a Ground Target With the Quad .50

Maj. Robert V. Reitan



Figure 2. Aligning the vernier on the azimuth




Figure 3. Limiting displacement of observer

THERE are many different ways to determine azimuth and elevation and to adjust the fire of the quad .50 machine gun on the M16 motor carriage when used on indirect fire missions against a ground target. One simple method has been devised and tested by the AA & GM Branch of The Artillery School.

A 6400-mil azimuth scale of aluminum was made and installed on the stationary part of the turret. The scale is divided into 100-mil segments. A vernier, graduated in 5-mil increments, was designed to clamp on the movable part of the turret. With this azimuth scale and vernier, one or several M16s can be fired as a battery. (See Figure 1.)

The turret can be oriented in azimuth, using an aiming circle or M2 compass by two methods:

(1) Orient the aiming circle, then sight along the right inboard gun and note the reading on the azimuth scale. The cannoneer sights the right inboard gun on the aiming circle. He then positions the vernier at the 100-mil reading of the aiming circle's back azimuth and extends the vernier past the 100-mil reading by the exact number of mils.

Example: Aiming circle reading is 4524 mils. Back azimuth reading to gun is 1324 mils. Position the vernier so that a 24-mil reading on the vernier is aligned with the 1300-mil graduation on the azimuth scale. Result: azimuth reading of 1324 mils. (See Figure 2.)

(2) Using the M2 compass, sight the instrument along the right inboard gun from a distance of about 50 yards from the mount and have the cannoneer sight the right inboard gun on the compass. Give him the back azimuth of the compass reading. He places the vernier on the azimuth scale at that reading and the turret will be oriented on north.

Since the azimuth scale is fixed, one limitation is present. Because of the armor plating on the front of the turret, the left side of the M16 in occupying a position, should not face the general direction of fire because the vernier would be under the armor plating.

THE tank azimuth method can also be used. If the gun crew and observer can see some prominent terrain feature or object in the general direction of fire, the observer will instruct the cannoneer to sight along a barrel until it is lined up with the prominent point. At that time the cannoneer will set zero index

MAJOR ROBERT V. REITAN, Artillery, is on duty at the AA & GM Branch of The Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas.

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The "new" war in Korea is a war of artillery and mortar fire. These are 2d Division infantrymen seeking protection from enemy mortar fire on "Old Baldy."

## KOREA — THIRD PHASE

*There is a "new" war in Korea, but there is also opportunity—if we have the vision to see, the wisdom to plan and act, and the patience to outlast the enemy*

**Jonathan Carmen**

THE names that have long marked the line of battle—"Heartbreak Ridge," "Triangle Hill," "Sniper Ridge," "Iron Horse Mountain" and "The Hook"—remain in the news from Korea. And from the men who know these names the best comes the word that there is a "new" war in Korea.

If so, and the men in the command posts if not the lines themselves should know, this the *third* war there since 25 June 1950. The first was the heartsickening "yo-yo" war up and down South Korea and the inspiring victories following the Inchon landings, ending with the Chinese intervention. The second war continued through the restoration of the Eighth Army by General Ridgway and the holding of the present lines during the long, frustrating months of truce talks.

How long this new—this "third"—war will last and what its final result will be no one on either side of the lines can say. The decision to make war in Korea was Moscow's and the decision to stop it will be Moscow's too—if we accept the premise that the UN will stand fast in its determination to stop aggression everywhere by stopping it in Korea.

JONATHAN CARMEN is the pseudonym of a journalist who has had more than ten years of military service.

Of course if that determination became unstuck certain choices would be available.

Korea could be abandoned to the Communists and the ROK government left to its inevitable fate. Or the Communists' truce proposals could be accepted.

Either of these two courses of action would constitute defeat for the United Nations and almost surely the loss of all of Asia to the Communists.

United Nations forces in Korea could be substantially strengthened and an offensive mounted that would drive the Communists out of Korea. This would mean larger contributions of manpower by all of the participating nations, plus possibly Japanese and Chinese Nationalist forces. If we disregard the political difficulties involved in using either Japanese or Chinese Nationalist forces, there still remains the problem of equipping and arming them. Neither Japan nor Formosa is capable of supplying and equipping its forces in combat and this burden would fall on U.S. production facilities.

The war could be broadened through aerial bombardment of China and Manchuria or through a blockade of China and Manchuria.


There are obvious dangers in either or both of these courses of action. Danger not only that it might result in

World War III but that it might involve us, as General Bradley once warned: "in the wrong war, in the wrong place, and at the wrong time."

A Hitler or a Stalin might start a larger conflict in order to extricate himself from a smaller one, but democracies are neither so power-blind, nor so egotistical. A world war may possibly erupt out of the Korean conflict (indeed the odds have favored that possibility ever since it began), but it will not come through the deliberate intent of the free world. "The advantages of successful war are doubtful; the disadvantages of unsuccessful war are certain," as General Bradley said at another time.

THUS we are still in the position we have been in for these many months. There can be no settlement in Korea until the Communists accept our truce talk proposals. We have gone as far as we can go with honor in seeking a truce. The decision for peace or prolonged conflict rests with the Communists. And now that they have started what the fighting men call a "third" war, it looks as though we are mere puppets jingling on the end of Communist strings.

But how does it appear to Stalin in Moscow and Mao in China? We must remember that Communists do not and





*The trail up Triangle Hill is tough and dangerous and the road back is misery for the walking wounded and the men on the litters.*

cannot look at things the way we do; they are ever captives of their own dogma. And so it may be that the "new" war in Korea was not deliberate choice, but Communist reaction to our—incredible to them—in insistence on standing by our principles in the prisoner repatriation question, and to our evident ability to hold our lines in Korea while building a strong ROK Army. This last development must be viewed with some misgivings in the political and military headquarters of the enemy.

A powerful ROK Army, capable of manning the front lines, could be a great catastrophe for Communism in Asia. Such a development would cut off the large propaganda profits the Korean conflict has netted them among Asians. With the help of the Koreans the free world may be able to build a backfire of propaganda in Asia that could undo most enemy gains in that field. Certainly the Communists will say, as they have been saying, that we enslave the Koreans and force them to do our fighting. But with our help the Koreans themselves can refute that canard, if we and they are canny in planning and in executing our plans.

**I**T will be quite a while, to be sure, before the ROK Army is strong enough

*South Koreans on White Horse Mountain get a respite from battle while their comrades from the Korean Service Corps pack ammunition up to them.*





*A ROK, evacuated down White Horse Mountain by aid men, who first dressed his wounds, and tagged him.*

to take over the lines. You don't build any army even in a single year's time, and the ROK Army poses especially difficult problems. Officers must be found from among a people who have little military tradition. Specialists must be trained from men who have small conception of how simple mechanical devices work. On top of these very real difficulties there is the fact that every weapon and every piece of equipment is furnished by our Army and must come from stocks that already have large demands on them—those of our own needs, the needs of other United Nations' forces in Korea, and the needs of the nations of Europe and other parts of the world who are arming with our help.

But word of what we are doing, how and why, can be spread over Asia. Let the ROKs speak out. Let them tell how their officers attend our service schools, of their training behind the lines, of the good food they get, the medical care. The whole story. Let the ROK government tell how, though wracked by war, it has the freedom to enact laws and follow programs that the United States does not necessarily approve. If all of these things are done by the Koreans, with our help, when the time comes that the ROK Army stands on its own, it will be standing for all Asians; standing as a witness that the free world will help lift up Asians.

**I**N any war there is the possibility of defeat. There is no guarantee that the stronger, the better prepared, the more strategically emplaced side will win. And so now, more than two years after the

Korean conflict began, it must be apparent even to the Communists that though they have been calling the tune, they still have no assurance of victory.

They have their Communist dogma to reassure them: Capitalism contains the germs that will bring its own downfall; only the dictatorship of the proletariat can win. But we know that these are phony dogmas, completely false.

So on our side we have truth and righteousness. If we but lift up our eyes we can see that Korea is an opportunity—probably our sole remaining one—of freeing Asia and getting her on our side. But we must lift up our eyes, we must plan wisely, we must be stouthearted, and we must more than anything else, acquire some of that Oriental patience that can be so exasperating, but is so valuable in times like these.

**T**HE new war in Korea is a war of artillery duels, with the Doughboys in the lines digging deeper and deeper into the Korean mountains. It resembles the trench warfare of 1914-18. That war

was won because time proved to be on the side of the Allies. On whose side is time now?

It's on ours only if we use it wisely and not just in Korea, but all over the free world; use it to build economic, political and military strength.

Otherwise time will be on the side of the Communists. They have lost little in Korea—a few hordes of which they have many. And they have gained much—they have gained "face" in Asia by driving the forces of the United States and the other United Nations out of North Korea and holding them at bay for many months.

Time itself is neutral. It does not choose the side on which it fights. It is the instrument of those who will make it work for them. The strategic battle shapes up as a contest over which world—the enslaved or the free—will best use time and thus capture it as an ally.

We can win that struggle because we are free, flexible and generous. The Communists cannot because being slaves to a dogma, they must enslave others.



*F-84 Thunderjets rise from a Korean base with the aid of JATO. The air war goes on in North Korean skies, from the Yalu to the Parallel.*

*Patton tanks ford a river on the central front, moving into position to add their fire to the rising tempo of battle all along the lines.*







*During*  
**REPORTS AFTER ACTION**

The supporting arms and services in Korea

# THE 4.2-INCH MORTAR IN KOREA

**Letters from the commander of a  
Chemical Mortar Battalion in Ko-  
rea to the Chief of the Chemical Corps**

Hq. 2d Cml. Mortar Bn  
APO 301 c/ P.M.  
San Francisco  
13 November 1950

DEAR GENERAL BULLENE:

I wrote to Colonel Efnor [Lt. Col. Sam Efnor, Jr.] the other day and told him of the activities of the battalion and asked him to pass this information on to you. There is not much to add at present. We are now with U.S. troops on the offensive again, and the battalion is doing very well.

I have been promised some new mortars and when we get them the entire battalion will be in action. We have had a great deal of breakage of mortar parts—elevating screws and traverse nuts are the principal ones. Replacement parts that we brought from Edgewood Arsenal are nearly exhausted and there are no other 4.2-inch mortar parts in Korea.

I have not permitted fire over 4,000 yards. It has been extremely difficult to keep the mortars in range. There are no roads as we know them, only narrow cart trails barely pass-

able (one way) by jeep—and then only in dry weather. These cart tracks are nearly always raised well above the surface of adjacent rice paddies. Once a vehicle is off the trail it is nearly always bogged down for good. Tremendous frontages assigned to infantry units require us to do a great deal of rapid movement so hand-carry is entirely out of the question.

Ammunition has been a terrific problem but so far we have never had less than 100 rounds per mortar on position. This requires great effort and much truck movement as supply lines are very long in point of hours of travel.

THIS IS ANOTHER in the series of after-action reports covering the work of supporting arms and services in Korea. THESE LETTERS by Colonel Bell were furnished to the Chief of Military History by General Bullene and are published with the permission of both General Bullene and Colonel Bell. They have added interest at a time when the 4.2-inch mortars are being transferred from the Chemical Corps to the Infantry.



I am operating a very small forward command post. I have with me the S3, the assistant S3, the S2, communication officer, and surgeon—together with 22 enlisted men. The rest of headquarters company, under Maj. [Merritt W.] Briggs, is about 20 miles to the rear where they can work in comparative calm and comfort. This has many advantages as the administrative personnel can settle down in one spot and stay there for a week or more while we move nearly every day. The small detachment up here can move quickly and does not clutter up congested trails. For security we tie-in to some nearby infantry battalion or regimental command post when we stop for the night.

If any other chemical units come over here they should bring additional tentage. We have very little and there is no shelter available. The few buildings are pre-empted by higher commands, leaving only open fields for people like us. It is bitter cold and, though the battalion has drawn special winter clothing, the men still suffer because there is no shelter. A couple of squad tents in each company rear would be worth their weight in gold.

I keep the company rear echelon near to me. This consists of their mess truck, supply truck and motor maintenance truck—with the personnel from these sections. The battalion sees to all supply of ammunition, rations and POL. We feed two hot meals and one C ration meal to the forward units. However, a few of us who are constantly on the move rarely have anything but C rations. The kitchen crews must be able to bake good bread for there are no bakeries over here.

Personal cleanliness is difficult as there are no laundries or shower points. The country is crawling with lice and fleas. I require frequent foot inspection as I am most fearful of trench foot.

We are fighting mostly against the Chinese now as the North Korean units are broken badly and fight principally as guerrillas. The Chinese are well equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. The Chinese usually attack down draws and bottoms and in covering these approaches, our mortars have done their best work. The Chinese take terrific losses but they keep on coming. Our mortar men get into frequent small-arms fights.

We certainly need the new M30 mortar badly and have hopes of receiving it one of these days. If I had only one in each company it would be useful in reaching the 120mm mortar used by the Chinese. Their mortar has a range of 6,500 yards and they can sit back and plaster hell out of us while we are out of range. The best anti-mortar weapon is another mortar.

There is much more that I could tell but I have so little time. The morale of the battalion is very high and the men are full of fight, wishing to avenge our losses at Unsan. We do not really need anything here except 36 mortars and three or four more mortar battalions equipped with this new weapon.

Very Sincerely Yours,

E. V. H. BELL  
Lt. Col., CmlC

16 December 1950

DEAR GENERAL BULLENE:

Following the withdrawal of all United Nations forces to

the Chongchon River in November, the battalion was attached to the 5th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division, and rushed to Kunu-ri. The 24th Division was relieved by the 2d Division and we shifted to that outfit.

Since the withdrawal from Unsan, the battalion has been committed and shooting every day. We had Company C intact with all three platoons, and Company B with two platoons. Company A, having lost or destroyed all of its mortars and nearly all of its other equipment, was out of action.

Early in November as things were not too rosy, I sent our administrative section back to Sukchon. I reinforced Companies B and C with officers and men from Company A. Refitting Company A was a terrific task as we had to go all the way back to Pusan for the vehicles and most of the equipment. Efforts to have corps or army re-equip us were unsuccessful. Only aggressive and hard driving action on the part of Capt. [Clair L.] George, battalion S4, and his assistants got us our equipment. They went to Pusan, drew the trucks, loaded supplies, and then drove them more than 450 miles over the world's worst roads.

We were able to replace only half of our losses in vehicles and even less of the communications equipment. I completely reorganized the battalion while in the lines and redistributed personnel and equipment to have Companies A and B each with three platoons. We had Company A back and shooting just two weeks to the day after they were knocked out.

When the drive started about Thanksgiving, we were attached to the 9th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division. We had pushed northeast to a point a few miles north of the town of Kujang-dong when the Chinese hit us again. The 9th RCT was badly cut up as was part of the 38th RCT. Company C was overrun and initially we got only four jeeps, one officer and 24 enlisted men out of the mess. Later most of our personnel either drifted back or were located in clearing stations. I sent the survivors back to our rear which I had just moved to Kunu-ri. We kept Companies A and B in the fighting and it was hot.

The next day the Chinese hit again and the big retreat started. We pulled out with what was left of the 2d Battalion, 9th RCT, the last to leave. They had 274 officers and men and we loaded them on our vehicles. We retreated to Won-ni where we put up a road block which lasted just two hours. It was about 0330 when the infantry battalion commander reported to me that he had only 30 men left of the 274, so we all pulled back to Kunu-ri. We went into position there and the following night, at about 1900, received an order to pull out—saving what we could but destroying any equipment we could not get out. At the time we received our march order, we were firing at a range of 700 yards. We lost only one jeep trailer, which upset and was burned.

After a rough night, I gathered up the pieces and reformed the battalion. We were immediately attached to the British 27th Commonwealth Brigade, this making our fifth attachment in 25 days. That's enough, in itself, to drive a battalion commander stark mad.

We joined the British and have been with them ever since. I am happy with this attachment. These people know their business; they know heavy mortars.

We have been the covering force for IX Corps since early in the retreat and the battalion constitutes the light artillery

for the brigade. We have not yet been able to obtain any replacement of our equipment losses at Kujang-dong by legal means, but as we are the rear guard of a retreating army, we have picked up some gear. Our S4 with a party of 35 men is now in Pusan and I hope to see them back here tomorrow with enough equipment to place Company C back into action with two platoons.

We could not operate more than eight mortars per company no matter how much equipment we had, for our strength is down to 23 officers and 352 enlisted men. I have cut headquarters company down hard in order to get a hundred officers and men in each of the letter companies. But even to operate only eight mortars the "bread is sliced mighty thin" and most men have two jobs to do.

While I feel horrible over the loss of so many fine officers and men, it is a little comforting to know that we lost them while fighting, not while retreating. Company C, for example, knew that they were being swamped but they fired defensive fires at 600 yards and had only ten rounds left in the company when the last rush hit. They were able to destroy eleven of their twelve mortars. The Chinese got to the vehicles first, as usual.

Very Sincerely Yours,

E. V. H. BELL  
Lt. Col., CmlC

31 December 1950

DEAR GENERAL BULLENE:

We are still attached to the British 27th Brigade and have 24 mortars in action with a total strength of 338 enlisted men and 23 officers. Of the 33 chemical officers who left Edgewood Arsenal with us, only 19 are still here. Of the fourteen who have left, five are missing in action, two are wounded in action, four hospitalized for non-combat causes, and three have been transferred. None of the four hospital cases will be returned within 90 days. This leaves us pretty short-handed both for officers and enlisted men, but we are doing all right.

You will be interested to know that we have never been withdrawn for reorganization nor have we received any enlisted replacements. We have received four officers since we were committed. Unfortunately these officers knew nothing of mortars and damn little about combat troops. We lost one officer within three weeks, and it was a shame—like sending a lamb to slaughter.

I feel very strongly that if the Chemical Corps is to continue to have chemical mortar battalions, it should procure and train the correct type of combat officers for this duty. I would not give a tinker's damn if such an officer did not know one end of a test tube from another, but I would insist that he have a thorough knowledge of infantry organization, tactics, and weapons. I would not care about college degrees if the officers had the will to fight.

I also feel that chemical mortar battalions should not be sent to any theater as chemical mortar battalions unless the use of toxics is contemplated. The personnel may be sent as filler replacements or the mortar companies may be sent out as heavy mortar units but there just is no slot for a chemical battalion except where chemical munitions are to be used.

This present attachment is by far the best one that we have

had. The 27th Brigade has no heavy mortars and we fill the gap between their own 3-inch mortars and the direct support artillery, thus bringing the brigade's fire power to nearly that of one of our regimental combat teams. We have an important slot to fill, but when we are attached to a U.S. division (and we have supported four of them), we are used only to reinforce the fires of their own heavy mortar companies. I have had to fight hard to keep our companies from being attached to the organic mortar companies. This is a waste of fire power, and worse still, a waste of manpower. A separate mortar battalion has no role in the present army organization except in the case of gas warfare.

We are in pretty good shape. Morale is high, and while the weather is bitter cold, our men are well equipped for it and can get along.

Very Sincerely Yours,

E. V. H. BELL  
Lt. Col., CmlC

12 January 1951

DEAR GENERAL BULLENE:

We are still in support of the 27th Brigade. With them, we were the last troops out of Seoul.

I do hope that one more effort will be made to award our people the Combat Infantryman Badge. It seems to me to be rank discrimination to keep this badge from our men simply because of the word "chemical" in our unit designation. The men in the heavy mortar companies of infantry regiments serve the same piece, fire the same ammunition, and are subject to the same hazards as are the men of our battalion. Frequently in Korea, the infantry heavy mortar companies have been attached to my battalion for operational control. Of course, when this was done, the more dangerous assignments were given by me to our own companies.

It is common practice for us to operate jointly with the infantry heavy mortar companies' forward observers, fire direction centers, communications and ammunition resupply. Occasionally we perform the security missions for an infantry mortar platoon and once we manned their mortars for them. It is interesting that we are able to keep eight mortars per company in action with present-for-duty strengths averaging less than 80 enlisted men per company. The infantry companies usually run 120 to 155 enlisted men and only attempt to keep five or six mortars in action.

We are getting along all right in spite of personnel shortages and the bitter cold. We do not know what the Army has planned to do, but in spite of the long, hard and bitter retreat, morale is high.

We have very little left of headquarters company as I have transferred every possible man to the mortar companies. The personnel section and most of the motor section are kept well to the rear, while I operate the forward command post with three other officers and eighteen enlisted men. It is amazing how much can be done by so few people, but it is quite difficult and the strain is beginning to tell. I rotate both officers and enlisted men as much as possible. A couple of weeks eating and sleeping back in our rear echelon restores a man a great deal.

Very Sincerely Yours,

E. V. H. BELL



# Soldiers in Politics

The good they can do is great but the effect on the Army is questionable and can be harmful

**T**HIS was written on the week end just before Election Day—and intentionally. Because, whether the General or the Governor is the President elect, when you read it, it should have no influence on what we say here about the effect on the Army (and other military services) of professional military men in party politics.

Actually, we could have written this even before the Chicago conventions of last July. Involvement of our professional soldiers in politics has been going on for a long, long time. Since 1776, in fact.

A few professional military men have entered the political life of the nation deliberately and we can hope with the highest motives. But others—and we are most concerned with these—have found themselves pinned with a political label because they acted or spoke as they believed their duty and position demanded—and always in the interests of the United States.

A half generation of war, uneasy peace and more war has been our recent lot. And as professional military men necessarily moved up into positions of great responsibility and trust, politicians have sought to enroll this or that General or Admiral in their party and put him up for high office. This was to be expected and we can assure ourselves that those who did consciously enter the political arena did so because they thought it their duty. One expression of this was General Eisenhower's declining President Truman's offer to get him the nomination of the Democrat Party in 1948, and his acceptance of the Republican nomination in 1952. Only a man with firm convictions would resist one nomination and accept another. But such high motives do not still the politicians of the opposition. And so their talk of the "evils of militarism," and their derisive hoots about how the professional soldier lives apart from the main stream of American life, does the Army no particular good.

These are little more than irritants that might at least make the Army aware of how some of its cherished forms are viewed by civilians. But unfortunately, the politicians don't stop there. And in justice to them we should say they probably can't. A political leader who doesn't throw everything he can at what he considers the opposition's weaknesses may be less than loyal to his party and the country. It isn't pretty, but it is our way and we seem to thrive on it.

Unfortunately, when one of the candidates is a professional soldier his prior professional acts become political issues. Thus the Korean issue involved, willy-nilly, the

question of what General Eisenhower had or had not recommended when he was a member of the JCS.

We could argue—as we believe—that a professional soldier should not be answerable for his deliberate official decisions, but we could not argue successfully that a President could not open these decisions to public debate. Such debate should refrain from considering the motives of individual members of the JCS, but no one could believe that it would when one of the members was a candidate for political office.

As a result the act of General Eisenhower became a political question. Other professional military men were also dragged into the matter by both parties.

The greater danger lies here—in the area beyond the professional soldier who seeks high office. If JCS decisions are to be publicly debated and the motives of individual members of the JCS questioned, is it not possible that future decisions of the JCS might not be made solely on military merits? If a member of the JCS reaches a point where he can hardly help keeping one eye on the political aspects of decisions in the effort to provide all-around protection for his professional future, the value of his service becomes impaired and the military security of his country is weakened.

**B**UT there is still another evil and this aspect is possibly the most pernicious of all. Almost two years ago Senator Taft said publicly that he no longer had any confidence in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What he clearly meant was that he considered the JCS a tool of the Administration.

This meant, in Mr. Taft's opinion at least, that General Bradley was a general of the Democrat Party. And yet, so far as we know, General Bradley has never in his military life uttered a word that would show political leanings.

A few months later the long and risky MacArthur Hearings had the Washington stage and whatever benefit the American public got from that production was more than offset by the political paint job it applied to every military man who testified.

**H**ALF of the federal budget in these troubled years is spent by and for the military services. The funds are voted by Congress on the recommendation of a small minority of the membership which holds lengthy hearings at which the military budgets are dissected and explained by military men and civilians of the mili-

tary establishment. It is impossible for any one congressman or senator, or even a group of congressmen or senators, to be expert on every facet of the defense budget. And so they must accept the explanations of the witnesses—and anyone who knows much about these things, knows that the testimony of the experienced soldier wearing stars is most persuasive of all. It is quite possible that of all the great services General George C. Marshall has rendered his country, his greatest was his ability to appear before congressional committees and patiently explain the facts of military survival to congressmen. Had he appeared as a political figure rather than a professional soldier above and beyond politics, he would have failed.

Politicians will play politics. That is their business and their way of life. And so they will play politics with soldiers, even with soldiers who have no desire to enter into political frays. And that being so, the time may come (and we fear it may be on us) when a politician will vote, not for this or that appropriation because he trusts the soldier (or sailor or airman) who advocates it, but because this or that soldier has been labelled as a member of his own party. God help us if politicians ever vote for funds for Unified Command Blue because General A who commands it is reportedly sympathetic to their party. Or vote against funds for Unified Command Green because its commander, Admiral B, is supposed to belong to the opposition party.

**W**E can offer no solution. Soldiers cannot run away and hide from the wiles of beckoning politicians. General Sherman tried that once by moving the headquarters of the Army to St. Louis. It didn't work for he found that the true headquarters of the Army is where reason, if not the Constitution, put it: in the offices of the War Department.

We can offer the hope that the people, who seem to have a deeper conviction than the politicians, that the role of the soldier should be above and beyond the maelstrom of partisan politics, will insist that the politicians quit trying to infect soldiers with political germs.

The soldier himself should recognize that the step into politics is usually not a conscious one and that it creeps up upon men of ability and a strong sense of duty when they are in positions of great power. The good a high-minded soldier can do in politics is great, but the possible baleful influence on the Army could more than offset it.



**Lt. Col. C. C. DeReus**

*When stalwart men man a patrol base forward of the MLR*

## THE PERIMETER PAYS OFF

**I**N the late summer and early fall of 1951 in Korea, the expert organizers of a perimeter defense became masters of the situation. Wide frontages, terrain, and a scarcity of infantrymen gave them their opportunity.

Patrols that went deep into enemy territory and at maximum medium artillery ranges were the principal activity. To the expert at the time-and-space calculations, such deep forays into enemy territory were physically impossible unless the patrols were large, self-sustaining units operating on missions of twenty-four hours' duration or longer. These

patrols operated out of *patrol bases*, and actually started from what might well be considered enemy territory.

Units ranging in size from reinforced platoons to battalion combat teams were placed on key terrain four to five thousand yards forward of front-line positions to maintain contact with the enemy, provide bases from which to patrol to determine enemy dispositions, and capture prisoners. These isolated positions were choice targets for mass night attacks by the Chinese and North Korean Communist forces. A quick glance at the situation map in any front-line regiment indicated at first glance that the commander had lost his mind. His reserve, or a great portion of it, had been positioned on the wrong side of the main line of resistance.

**T**O best portray the finer points of establishing and operating a patrol base, an actual experience of the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, is detailed here. This battalion was the reserve battalion of the regiment. It had a threefold mission: It was to prepare a regimental reserve line, prepare and rehearse counterattack plans, and establish and maintain a company-sized patrol base some five thousand yards forward of the MLR. To avoid digression we shall discuss only the patrol base part of the battalion mission.

The position selected upon which to establish this patrol base was a small hill rising some 200 meters above the Chorwon-Pyongyang plain. Overlooking it from the northwest was a towering mountain ridge line strongly held by the CCF. This small knob, hereafter called Hill 284, was not more than 500 yards in diameter and was absolutely without cover. From it, patrols were to range to the north and west to locate CCF positions and to determine routes of advance for both infantry and armor. Secrecy and surprise were two principles that were to be sacrificed in organization of the position. Any movement on the position could be observed for miles. The main consideration was to get on the position early in the day and prepare quickly for action that was certain to come at night.


Company I was selected to organize the position and occupy it for four days. The first two days were to be spent in digging in and preparing the position for a determined defense before extensive patrolling would commence. Close-in villages were to be screened by patrols daily. Company K was sent on a wide enveloping sweep simultaneously to clear the area and to provide added labor necessary to accomplish organization of the position in the daylight hours. The pioneer and ammunition platoon were to join at the objective area with wire, pickets, flares, napalm drums, and tools. Movement to the position was made without contact, and work on the position proceeded ahead of schedule. By nightfall one band of double-apron wire was put in place, trip flares were installed and armed, fires were registered, and extra ammunition was stored on position. Although the organization was

LIEUTENANT COLONEL C. C. DeREUS, Infantry, entered the Army in 1941, was commissioned in 1942 and integrated into the Regular Army in 1945.

During the night, an enemy patrol scouted the positions and threw grenades into the perimeter in an attempt to draw automatic-weapons fire. One grenade landed in a position too close to the wire and two occupants were killed. Work continued at a feverish pitch the next day. Overhead cover was completed, another band of wire added, additional trip flares installed and additional fires were registered. The unit was out of range of 81mm or 4.2-inch mortars positioned behind friendly lines, but had attached to it a section each of the machine gun and recoilless rifle platoons from the heavy weapons company. All companies in the battalion had available twice the number of automatic weapons authorized and employed them while on defense. During the first two days patrols were sent to the north and west. One minor patrol probe by the enemy was repulsed each night. The balance of the battalion rehearsed an extrication plan (Figure 1), designed to relieve, during daylight, a unit on the patrol base that might be under heavy pressure. This extrication force consisted of the balance of the battalion with Company B, 64th Tank Battalion, attached.

Company L conducted only limited patrols during that day and spent the time re-registering fires (Figure 2), altering positions and studying the terrain surrounding it in conjunction with patrol plans for the next day. Added communication facilities were installed. A report from the company commander just before darkness indicated the isolated unit was prepared for whatever might come that night.

At about 1900 hours, some 7,000 meters to the northwest, the Chief of Staff, 125th CCF Division arrived at the command post of the 3d Battalion, 275th Regiment. This unit had just finished eating and was in a reserve defensive position, some



three hours march to the northwest of the UN patrol base. The Chief of Staff gathered the men of the battalion together and informed them that they would attack the UN Forces that night. They were to be careful, avoid capture, avoid excessive casualties, and overrun and capture the forces holding the position. Reports of previous patrols were given to the Officers. After the briefing the 7th, 8th, and 9th Companies were each assigned 24 men from the 10th [Heavy Weapons] Company. Sixteen of these men manned heavy machine guns and others were anti-tank men armed with 57mm recoilless rifles. All men were issued one day's combat ration of sorghum and rice and at least one company was issued eight Bangalore torpedoes and nine satchel charges—more than 60 pounds of explosives. Each rifleman was issued 100 rounds of small arms ammunition and six grenades. After being supplied, the attacking force dog trotted for about two hours, arriving at an assembly area about 3,000 meters northwest of the UN position. Here the battalion was joined by two companies of the 126th CCF Division. This was an ambush force designated to establish positions astride the probable withdrawal routes of the UN Forces. After these two companies had moved forward, the 7th, 8th, and 9th Companies followed in column to an attack position.

Scouts of the 8th Company had dis-

0435—L Co: Under heavy attack from north, east and southeast. Placing all



available fire on these positions. Wire blown at 1 o'clock. Red flare appears to be enemy signal to attack.

0437—Bn Commander to CO Cos I, K, M, and B Co, 64th Tk Bn: Move to assembly area CHARLIE. Cross line of departure at 0530.

0500—CO Co L to CO 3d Bn: Enemy using smoke again. Estimate enemy battalion attacking. Some enemy through the wire at a point near 1 o'clock. Continue all available illumination. Friendly casualties light so far. One LMG and one 57mm recoilless rifle knocked out. Have artillery place all fires they can on concentrations 197, 198, and 196. Illumination concentration 503 is very good.

0510—L Co: Bugles blowing at 2 o'clock. Red flare fired. Enemy apparently launching assault.

0520—CO 3d Bn to all unit commanders: Plan BAKER. Cross line of departure at 0530. I Co and B Co 64th Tk Bn to move as fast as possible to get in behind the enemy force.

The 7th and 8th Companies reached the breached wire and some of the men got through the wire but were killed by an automatic weapon near the gap. The 9th Company was suffering very heavy casualties from artillery, mortar and hand grenades. CO 9th Company killed by hand grenade. Men of the 9th Company overran one machine gun position but the gun would not fire. All of these men but one were killed by hand grenades.

0533—3d Bn to CO 7th Inf: Elements of Plan BAKER crossed LD at 0530.

0538—Co L: Estimate 30 enemy inside wire from 1 to 3 o'clock. One squad being shifted from 8 o'clock to help hold position.

About 20 men from the 9th Company rushed through the gap in the wire and assaulted the high ground. UN soldiers killed two with shovels and three with bayonets. The others tried to withdraw but could not find the gap in the wire. Most of them were killed with hand grenades.

0545—Co L: Whistles and bugles blowing at 2 o'clock. Two red and one green flare fired. Enemy appears to be withdrawing. 1st Sgt. Bowman killed. Are placing all available fires on enemy.

Orders to withdraw were issued by someone. The signal was a red, green, red flare combination. The assembly area was under extremely heavy artillery and mortar fire and someone told the remaining soldiers to run to the northwest for 2,000 yards. Casualties were told to walk out or they couldn't be taken out.

0550—Co L: Can see elements of I Co and tanks to the north of us. [It was now dawn and visibility was about 800 yards.] Send helicopter to evacuate casualties. Have three seriously wounded.

0620—CO 3d Bn to CO 7th Inf: Units of Plan BAKER now linked with L Co. Mopping up. Request helicopter be expedited. L Co's casualties light. CO L Co estimates 150 enemy killed. He has 9 PWs.

Reorganization was started immediately and search of the area surrounding the position of Company L for wounded, dead and prisoners by the extrication force continued. A supply train was organized to resupply L Company's

ammunition which was almost gone. At 0730 the extrication force was directed to return to the battalion assembly behind friendly lines, minus Company K. K Company was directed to start immediate preparation of another patrol base position 2,000 yards to the south of the base on Hill 255. L Company was directed to hold its position until dark, then withdraw to an assembly area behind friendly lines. L Company was to prepare booby traps within its position and on its perimeter. Wire was to be repaired, overhead cover increased and every effort made to create an appearance of continued occupancy. A hot meal was to be served at the position as soon as possible.

**B**ASED upon actual count, Company L had killed 162 enemy in and around its position. Of these, 36 were counted inside the barbed wire. Interrogation of prisoners gave reason to estimate that

an additional 110 had been killed and 150 wounded. Friendly casualties were four killed and twelve wounded and only three of the wounded were serious. A total of 78 foreign weapons of various makes were captured and 121 American weapons recovered. These weapons ranged from heavy machine guns to rifles.

Although courage and determination were decisive elements in the successful conduct of this defensive action, other factors were instrumental in providing the over-all success of Company L. The most important factor was the complete understanding of all men concerned of their mission, why they were so positioned, what to expect, and what action was expected of them. This had been accomplished through a detailed briefing of the men as directed by the battalion commander and accomplished by the company commander. This was of added importance since within Company L, 76




Figure 2. The fire plan.

men—approximately 40 per cent of the entire unit—were new men under enemy fire for the first time. They were told that they were expected to remain in position and fight throughout the night if attacked. No withdrawal would be made in darkness under any circumstances. If the unit was under heavy pressure, an extrication force would relieve that pressure at daylight. Knowledge of these points gave the men a reason to fight determinedly.

Long hours of hard work preparing the position paid off in dividends of enemy killed and a minimum of friendly casualties. Two bands of double-apron barbed wire were considered a minimum, and three bands had been completed astride the more critical avenues of approach. Three belts of trip flares were placed beyond the barbed wire to provide early warning and additional illumination. Antipersonnel mines were not used because of the necessity for constant movement of friendly forces in and out of the perimeter area. Overhead cover less than two feet in thickness was considered unsatisfactory. Communication trenches had been prepared connecting all positions within the area. Alternate positions for crew-served weapons were prepared with communication trenches leading to them from the pri-

mary positions. Last, but by no means least, was the dumping, *on position*, of adequate amounts of all types of ammunition. To indicate the amounts, each machine gun, light or heavy, was supplied with a minimum of 30 boxes of ammunition, each 60mm mortar had 400 rounds of high explosive plus 20 rounds of illuminating ammunition. Each individual soldier had 8 hand grenades and 6 bandoleers of caliber .30 ammunition. All ammunition was dug in close to the weapons position or near the fighting holes of the riflemen. In a prepared position such as this, there need not be any excuse for running out of ammunition during the course of a single night.

**O**F the major points of organization of the position, the preparation and constant improvement of the fire plan are the most important. All weapons must have a specific point or area to cover. The rifleman, with his M1, must be given a sector of fire, sectors or final protective lines, if available, must be assigned to the machine guns and the automatic rifles, and concentrations must be assigned to all indirect fire weapons and these concentrations must be registered. These pre-planned fires must be woven together to give a protective

screen. In a perimeter defense, these fires must be extended completely around the position. The initial planning of these fires and their first registration is not enough. A fire plan must be constantly studied for ways to improve it. All men must be told what concentration (by number) is in front of them and from what type weapon. Concentrations that were placed around this strong point were registered daily, preferably just before dark. Indirect fire concentrations that were initially in rice paddies were shifted to other locations since the effects of high-explosive ammunition were somewhat nullified by the water and mud in these paddies. A fire plan cannot be indiscriminately prepared. It must be built around possible enemy courses of action. An analysis must be made of all possible routes of approach and the fire plan must be flexible enough to cover any one or several of the routes.

Many other factors were involved and helped make the action successful. Some of these were communications, capable leaders, and esprit. I believe however, that without a man with the *will to fight*, a *position* that he can fight from, and *supplies* to fight with, and a *complete plan* of how he is to fight, the other points are useless.



In training they worked hard to be soldiers and  
in combat they earned the right to "belong."

Looking back, I say

## My Roks Were Good

**Lieutenant Lindsey P. Henderson**

**N**OT long after I joined Company L, 21st Infantry, 24th Division, in September 1950 I was given command of the 5th or "Gimlet" platoon, as the attached Republic of Korea troops were called in the 21st. The platoon consisted of 22 Koreans who had been with the company a short while, and 20 untrained Koreans who had joined us the night before I took over the platoon. My company commander, Lieut. Planter Wilson, gave me M/Sgt. Lester Studebaker and Sgt. Leon Wilson for assistants.

When I first inspected my platoon it was easy enough to tell who the old combat men were. I can't explain it exactly, but there is something about a combat man that you can feel.

LIEUTENANT LINDSEY P. HENDERSON, Infantry, served as platoon leader in the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, in Korea. He told another story about his Republic of Korea soldiers in the September 1951 issue of this magazine.

After the inspection the two sergeants and I got to work. The sergeants told me who the new men were and their opinions of the old men. We then reorganized the platoon.

Two of the men, Ryang Hyong Jin and Lee Han Tok, had had officer's

training. Ryang had been in the Army and Lee in the police force. I appointed them first and second lieutenants, respectively. Hong Chang Ki had been a district school superintendent. He was made first sergeant. Sergeant Wilson told me that Kim Hong Kwan, Kang Si Toe, Kim Ju Tong and An Nak Chan were the roughest, toughest, most fearless of the combat men, and were looked up to by the others. I appointed them sergeants first class and made them squad leaders.

As soon as the platoon was reorganized I called a meeting of my key men and told them what I intended to do and why.

First of all, I had to be sure that they felt like they "belonged," even though they were Koreans in an American outfit. Then I had to be sure that they understood what we were to do and that they had to earn the right to "belong."

Our job, I told them, was to point the



Shortly after the crossing of the Nakdong in September 1950, these four members of the "Gimlet" platoon were snapped by their platoon leader. The man bidden behind helmet and moustache is Master Sergeant Lester Studebaker, the platoon sergeant. Next is Sergeant First Class Leon Wilson, then Kim, the radio operator, and finally Yum, the platoon interpreter.



One of the tanks destroyed by the platoon on 23 September was photographed three days later. The bandaged man is Corporal Cho Byung Je who had attacked one of the enemy tanks with grenades. Lieutenant Henderson stands beside him.



attacks, do most of the extended patrolling and man listening posts. We were fighting in Korea and they knew the terrain and understood the language.

I told them that they would be responsible for the training and discipline of the men.

Oriental justice and discipline is foreign to the American way of thinking and doing things. It is forceful, swift and sometimes brutal, but it is what they expect, understand and respect. But I did not let my American noncoms use it for two reasons: our repugnance for brutality of any kind, and "face." It wouldn't do to have an Occidental strike an Oriental. There are those who would condemn an American officer who turned his head from native brutality but here I stand on the end results. My platoon gave me complete faith, devotion and loyalty.

Sergeant Studebaker, Sergeant Wilson and I supervised and made corrections where necessary. We spent every minute we could find on teaching the care and cleaning of weapons and tactical training. Hand-and-arm signals were thoroughly taught—and learned. Signals were a universal language and, in combat, would eliminate any confusion that might result from the loss or lack of an interpreter and the breakdown of communications. I made it clear that with few exceptions a man only makes one mistake in combat. Whenever we came off the line, if mistakes had occurred, we would double the training to iron out the bugs. The more training we had, the less likely we were to be killed.

**T**HE Gimlet platoon had forty-six warm bodies, including mine, and I hoped that in combat they would all be hot. In mock attack, the Gimlets looked and sounded ferocious. They were developing as a team, and the hand-and-arm signals seemed to be working. I wanted to work more with each squad and develop my fire teams to a fine point, but there wasn't time. The few days we had were much too short. I needed two more U.S. noncoms. With one for each 10-man squad I could exercise closer control. I was lucky in Sergeant Studebaker. He had been first sergeant of an outfit in the rear, but wanted action. He jokingly said he had been sent forward to be killed. He asked for it often enough, but he was a superior soldier, an old hand at combat and knew his business. Sergeant Wilson was young, sometimes rash and headstrong, but all guts; he knew his business too. He had been in combat since the first day in Korea, one of the few original

men who survived and remained with his company.

After a few weeks I did get two more noncoms. Sergeant Todd and Corporals Weber and Rounds each had something that we needed in the platoon. Due to the nature of our missions we were assigned an aid man. Good medics lift morale.

There has been much talk of AWOL, but the men of Company L reversed the procedure, they went AWOL to the unit. Officers and men who were lightly wounded in action were constantly skipping channels and leaving the hospitals as soon as they thought they were ready to return to the company. They knew they were needed. My Gimlets were no exception. As soon as they could walk, they left the hospitals and started looking for the company.

**O**NE day my ROKs were paid. Not much, to be sure, but it made them happy. Then a delegation, representing each squad, visited me. They wanted to contribute their pay to their own Government; it was enough that the U.S. Army fed, clothed and armed them. Deeply moved, I accepted their money and, through channels, sent it to the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Korea. Sometime later an acknowledging letter came back. In it the Minister spoke of his gratitude to his fellow citizens in the platoon and of his happiness that American and Republic of Korea soldiers "could fight for the common cause of humanity."

But I've gotten ahead of myself.

On 16 September we pushed back to the Nakdong River and took up positions about five miles south of Waegwan. On 18 September we crossed the Nakdong in assault boats under a murderous fire. We took the high ground on the enemy side of the river and the half-green platoon acquitted itself admirably. From that point on, we were on the upgrade.

At about 1630 hours 21 September 1950, Company L was pointing the advance of the regiment on the Waegwan-Kumchon road. When elements of the company were well within a town which was the headquarters for one of the crack Red tank divisions, tanks and automatic weapons opened up with heavy fire on us. The enemy fire was so strong our forces were ordered to withdraw. The artillery wasn't up yet, but the Old Man called for an air strike which was on the way. Sergeant Wilson had a patrol with a bazooka team on the left flank in town and I had one on the right flank. When the withdrawal was ordered, I got the word OK, but Wilson couldn't

be reached. As soon as I got back and heard about it, I took two men and went looking for him. Private First Class Charles Mersing, a volunteer, was my bazooka man and Corporal Yu Ok Sang, my runner. We had only one 3.5-inch round when we entered the town.

Sounds of a hell of a big fire fight broke through the general din of the battle. We headed in that direction, dodging Reds when we could, killing them when we couldn't. We found Wilson and his patrol engaging two T-34 tanks. As I looked over the situation, I saw Corporal Cho Byung Je running toward one of the tanks. He was evidently trying to get aboard. At that moment a Red stood up in the turret with a burp gun. He threw a burst at Cho and I saw Cho's helmet fly off as he fell to the ground, his face covered with blood. He struggled to his feet and wiped the blood from his eyes with his left arm as he pulled the pin from a grenade with his teeth and threw it at the gunner's turret which was still open. It was a perfect shot which exploded just inside, blowing pieces of the Reds out of the tank. Cho collapsed.

Another T-34 came up to join the show but we were out of bazooka ammo. In broken Japanese and Korean I asked Yu to try and make it back for more ammo. We had a beautiful position for that other tank and the goods didn't know where we were. Yu stripped down for the run, as I wrote a note asking for more ammo and to have a litter jeep ready for protection. He was scared, but he was all guts. As he slipped away I wondered if I'd ever see him again. The air strike was on and if the Reds didn't get him, one of our planes might.

Meantime, Sergeant Wilson had spotted us and worked around and through the Reds to our position. We waited awhile for the ammo, but as Cho had lost a lot of blood and had what looked like a serious head wound, I decided to withdraw to our lines. We had to stop and fight once or twice and during one of these breaks, Yu reappeared with a note. He had successfully infiltrated the enemy lines three times that afternoon. I'll never forget it.

"No more ammo. Find Sergeant Wilson and return immediately. We're leaving town."

All the way back, Cho had refused to be carried. The stamina of those ROKs is terrific, to say nothing of their guts. And believe me, it takes guts to throw grenades at tanks, and to take off into a swarm of Red fanatics with only a knife for protection.

It was at this point, I believe, that

whatever doubt there may have been about my Gimlets completely disappeared. My ROKs were good. But as time went on they became better. Being a 5th Platoon gave us a unique slot in the TO&E of the rifle company and gave me the opportunity to mold and develop them into a highly specialized raider-type unit that could do and did do almost anything. With the highly skilled American noncoms I had for my staff functioning like a group of G3 inspectors at every break from actual combat, the individual ROKs were sharpened into first-class fighting men. Fire teams and squads soon developed into unbeatable combat teams.

Probably the biggest problem I had was teaching defensive tactics. Making my Gimlets understand that in the attack, on patrol, setting an ambush, no matter what the immediate mission might be, every time we halted we were on the defensive and must take security measures, wasn't easy. When they learned that lesson, their effectiveness as raiders was greatly increased. Whether at squad or platoon level, I found that "simple and direct plans, promptly, boldly and thoroughly executed, are usually decisive."

Some outfits in Korea didn't get much use out of their ROKs. Some of them tried the "Buddy system," sometimes successfully, but most outfits generally used them as ammo bearers. The trouble, it seems to me, is that the average American soldier lacks the *patience* of the Oriental. This lack of patience, the language barrier (which in itself was an almost insurmountable obstacle) and the apparent lack of advance briefing on, and understanding of the ROK soldier, created real difficulties. Then there was the sour hangover from the first days of the war when the partially trained, inadequately armed and poorly led ROKs almost completely disintegrated in the face of the enemy. Units of well-led ROKs that fought well were forgotten. We solved the problem in Company L just by facing up to it. You have to recognize that some American soldiers will always take advantage of a "not so bright" buddy, no matter what his race, color or creed. Because they didn't understand the ROK, some American GIs used him as a pack horse. It's no wonder that these men lacked spirit.

ONCE one of my patrols picked up a scared, sick, war-weary young Red. We fed him and kept him until we had bagged a few more to make it worth while to send an escort back to the battalion POW compound. When he found

that he wasn't going to be killed or mistreated, he told us that about twenty-five of his friends wanted to surrender but were almost as afraid of their leaders as they were of us. I took a chance on him. I wrote out a safe-conduct pass in case he should tangle with one of our patrols, and at dusk let him slip through our lines. It paid off. The next morning he returned with twenty-six of his friends. We fed them and sent them back to battalion S2. This side venture, we figured, had saved a lot of ammo and maybe a few lives.

It took a great deal of self discipline for my ROKs to take prisoners at all. They had found their towns and villages laid waste and their families gone, many never to return. Every one of my Gimlets had at least one close member of his family to revenge. Some had lost their families; like Lieutenant Ryang Hyong Jin. Although his home was at Kaesong, his family had been living in Seoul, and when we went into the assembly area a few miles north of Seoul, I let Ryang go home. He returned the next morning and reported in to me. He told me that friends told him that his mother, father and brother had been executed by the North Koreans, and his two sisters had been added to a Red brothel and were taken north when the Reds withdrew.

Ryang requested permission to take over the training for the rest of the morning. Knowing that work would occupy his mind, I said OK. He saluted and with cold hatred in his voice said, "The communist dogs will pay, Lieutenant Dixie; they will pay dearly."

Just before Thanksgiving of 1950, we got orders to advance into forward assembly areas. My ROKs were jubilant—primed for a fight.

"This is going to be a reconnaissance in force," our company commander told his platoon leaders. "The whole front is moving forward on line. It's going to be a slow process. We will advance from seven to ten miles a day, dig in and send out patrols to probe for the enemy. If the patrols don't make contact, the front will move forward to the next phase line and the process will be repeated until the enemy is contacted or we reach the Yalu."

He continued with the briefing, outlining what each platoon would do and their areas of responsibility. Then he turned to me.

"Dixie, I've got an extra job for your Gimlets. The S2 says that we have Korean agents behind the enemy lines that will be infiltrating through to us. They will carry identification. They are to be

sent back to battalion without delay as soon as we meet them. But I want to know what's out front, too. How do you think we can work it?"

I suggested sending one of my squads out with each patrol (they had to be big anyway) and my men could interrogate PWs or agents as they were brought in. This would eliminate delay at our CP and still give us immediate intelligence. The plan was approved. When we moved at daybreak Company L was on the battalion's left flank. King was on our right and Charlie was on our left. We met only token resistance.

We took Chongju again, dug in and sent patrols out. If all went well, we would make the border in five days. All didn't go well.


Corporal Rounds' patrol brought in three Allied agents, four Reds and a new Russian jeep. He reported a mine field being laid on our front. The agents reported thousands of mounted troops about fifteen miles to our right front. This information was phoned back while the agents were back for further interrogation. We were ordered to dig in solid. Other reports were coming in.

The honeymoon was over. Before the information could be completely evaluated, the Reds hit the center again. Another bugout, the biggest, was on the way. However, the enemy had been forced to fight before he was set. By making him fight then, costly though it was to us, it threw him off balance and prevented his buildup for a winter offensive that might have pushed us out of Korea.

MY ROKs fought well—as they always did. They were men who traded, borrowed and even liberated BARs from rear-echelon troops so that they could have two to a squad and make the fire teams more effective. They were men who calculated their risks and had only twenty-seven casualties, none killed, while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. They were the men who attacked in helmet liners or fatigue caps. They were the men who charged the enemy with bayonets gleaming, confident of victory. They were men (just cogs in the great Yo-Yo that swung up and down the Korean peninsula, from victory to bugout to victory again), secure in the knowledge that they were a part of the best company, battalion, regiment and division in the world. They believed it. So do I.

My Gimlets proved to me that ROK troops or any troops can be good—if given superior training and a feeling of belonging.





*Superlative individual training and confidence created by crawling through an infiltration course are not enough. We must emphasize small-unit teamwork and give thorough practice in the simple basic plays of the rifle platoon.*

IN a little military classic titled *The Defence of Duffer's Drift*, which is no longer to be found in the lists of Combat Forces Book Service, Lieutenant Backsight Forethought and his platoon are dropped off at an isolated stream crossing to hold it for three days, come what may. Now the Lieutenant was a regular, ambitious and enthusiastic. He had graduated from the service schools appropriate to his rank. Reflecting on all the regulations, precedents, and map problems he could call to mind—just how to organize his platoon and, without hope of support for three days, defend a stream crossing against anticipated superior strength—had him badly bewildered. Had his problem called for disposing a division—that would have been easy. In the service schools he had solved several problems about divisions, and he'd come out very well, too.

In his uncertainty, Lieutenant Backsight Forethought put off the problem and simply fed his men and made them comfortable. During the night the enemy came and captured the crossing after only the briefest skirmish.

In the book it was all a dream, and in successive dreams he was given chances to solve the same problem and finally he solved it correctly.

**BRIGADIER GENERAL EDWIN H. RANDLE**, Retired, is a former Doughboy who fought against the Germans in both World Wars and the Japanese in the Second. Retirement, he tells us, has given him "leisure to reflect, evaluate and write, and I hope the results may be helpful to those who seek them."

This fable, written many years ago, points up the problem of the tactical training of junior leaders and smaller units. In practice this training is today only a little farther along than when the breechloading rifle broke down massed battle formations, and thrust tactical decision and maneuver on officers and noncommissioned officers whose previous battle function had been to get their units properly into the mass and set examples of courage. The substandard quality of such training has been obvious to nearly everyone in two great wars. But not many have deduced the cause and the cure.

We can't blame this on The Infantry School. Over the years it has developed and taught sound tactics. It has had to compress into limited time the ever-expanding techniques of infantry. It has never pretended to be able to give each officer full practice in his trade.

Nor should blame be placed on junior leaders themselves. They have done the best they could under an inadequate and haphazard training system.

In preparing for combat in World War I, small-unit leaders received practically no worthwhile tactical training. As a potential company officer I remember executing squad rushes purely as a mechanical drill, across a forty-acre field, in full pack under a blazing July sun. I took part only once in the operation of an advance guard. And I listened to an uninspired officer read from a book the exploits of "Sergeant Hill."

But with this tactical equipment we were soon commanding platoons and

companies. And not much later we were up against good German troops with three years of combat behind them.

We were pretty fair at close-order drill and we'd spent hours throwing dummy hand grenades in a most unnatural manner. (In two World Wars I never saw an American soldier throw one in combat other than by pulling the pin and heaving it as came most handy.) We spent hours putting on and taking off gas masks, which any nitwit can learn to do in thirty minutes. Out of all proportion and reason, time was taken from the subject used in combat all day, and day after day—small-unit tactics. Tactical skill that breeds confidence and resourcefulness, gains ground, kills the enemy, saves lives, wins battles and makes the communiqués come true was mostly a closed book to us.

We learned our tactics in combat as most American junior leaders have had to do. Trial-and-error was the method and skillful enemy troops were the instructors. The lessons they gave us were costly, very costly. There is a much better way.

With the coming of World War II and during the years just before it, there was great improvement in doctrine, technique, and manuals. The Infantry School had been founded and was giving intelligent and serious thought to small-unit tactics. But there was little improvement elsewhere. Everyone discussed it, gave lip service to its importance, criticized junior leaders for its unsatisfactory state—but then permitted lack of imagination, restricted facilities,





*"It's situation number two,  
You're Sergeant Hill, now what do you do?  
You're wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong.  
It isn't that at all."*

WORLD WAR I TRAINING CAMP DITTY

## It's Situation No. 2

**Brigadier General Edwin H. Randle**

inertia, and every old and new military hobby to encroach on its schedule and prevent its practice. There were a few memorable exceptions.

**W**ITH the expansion of 1940 and the next two years, small-unit training was still sacrificed to almost everything else. Training was highly centralized, contrary to all previous doctrine. Rigid directives went down from Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, army, corps and division headquarters, prescribing by hour, and hour after hour, our old friends: grenade throwing, gas-mask drill, individual cooking, and so on. Conscientious GIs felt they weren't earning their salt unless issuing such directives.

Most directives pertained to the individual soldier and little time was left for small-unit tactical training. We were developing fair individual soldiers and specialists, but few if any skillful platoons, companies and battalions.

I do not mean to imply that the directives were valueless. My quarrel is with their emphasis, and the cumulative effect they had on division and regimental commanders. I am sure any commander would prefer to have platoons, companies and battalions which could march, shoot, and skillfully attack the enemy, than collections of soldiers who could do a multiplicity of things as individuals, but who in action would be the first to cry, "We are pinned down. What shall we do?"

A soldier must be able to march, shoot, use cover, live in the field, know something of his enemy, and perhaps even

climb up and down a net on the side of a ship. But these things do not require day after day of practice. A man can learn all there is to know about climbing a net in two tries.

But superlative individual training is not enough. Unless the soldier is able to play his part with confidence and skill in a rifle platoon; unless he is thoroughly practiced in the team plays and techniques which make a unit a controlled, coherent, skillful group able to use its combined fire power to the greatest effect—unless he is able to be a part of a team, the finest individually trained soldier will fail in combat.

So much time was used up in individual training that not much remained for training tactical units. Higher commanders were in a hurry to get on to division and corps maneuvers, with the result that platoons, companies, battalions and even regiments had their training time compressed within far too narrow limits. But the fighting effectiveness of a division is no better than its platoons, companies, and battalions.

Another factor is the astonishing absence of continuity of command and assignment within the smaller units. Squad leaders as well as their seconds in command, scouts, special-weapons men and the like, are shifted about so much that it is rare for one of these teams to have the same leader and be composed of the same men on any two consecutive training days. Lieutenants and platoon sergeants are always fair game for special-duty assignments.

Suddenly the unit is alerted. Train-

ing tests are held and everyone deplores the fact that small-unit leadership and skill are not all they should be. How could they be when the continuity of small units and their team training are subordinated to every other consideration? I venture to say that most platoons went into action in World War II under lieutenants and platoon sergeants who had had no hand in their training, and with a large percentage of men with whom neither the leaders nor the platoon had ever before worked.

It will be argued that lack of continuity is habitual in battle. Of course it is. But by the time the battlefield is reached, the platoon, company and battalion should have attained such a degree of confidence and skill in their standard plays that they can carry on in spite of substitutions, particularly when the substitutes have been trained in the same basic plays and the same techniques of combined firepower. When units have never had a chance to develop team skill, even though composed of courageous, determined and well trained individuals they will be clumsy, timid, suffer needless losses, and be lacking in complete effectiveness.

Among the handicaps to effective small-unit tactical training are large-scale maneuvers as they have been conducted in the past. Large maneuvers are costly, time is usually very limited and the tendency, therefore, is to attempt to cram into them every possible tactical experience. The result is that junior leaders become confused, angry and discouraged. Finally throwing all sound tactics to



*"In two World Wars I never saw an American soldier throw a grenade in combat other than by heaving it as came most handy."*

the winds they end up by ordering, "To hell with it! The blue flags are up; get on to the next ridge any old way, but get there." Of course at the critique the state of small-unit training is deplored, but until large maneuvers are run on a realistic time schedule the Pickett's Charge tactics will inevitably recur.

In the opinion of many thoughtful officers the controlled exercise is a better training vehicle for both large and small units than the free maneuver. When free maneuvers are used difficulties of control demand that they should be limited to pre-close contact situations. As soon as close contact has taken place, troops, except headquarters and communications personnel, should be withdrawn and thereafter the situation developed as a command post exercise. Commanders and staffs will gain just as much benefit and the infantry troops will be spared experiences detrimental to their tactical training.

It used to be maintained that sound training, often repeated, habituated the soldier to a correct course of action in battle regardless of fear, excitement, confusion and the many other stresses of combat. This is still sound psychology and it applies to tactical training just as to close-order drill. Yet in the late war this concept of thoroughness and repetition was largely thrown out the window in order that the junior officer and soldier might get the greatest variety of individual techniques and information—in the vain hope that it would stick and be useful. Our infantry soldiers of World War II received far more military information than their fathers in World War I; their discipline was no better and, like their fathers, they had to learn most of their small-unit tactics on the battlefield.

**A** rifle platoon is the basic fighting team of the division. But in most rifle platoons we count too heavily on there being at least one natural star. He is the man of outstanding initiative and courage who compensates for the uninspired execution of his teammates. He is the man who carries the platoon forward and wins the decorations. Frequently he is not even the nominal leader. I have seen a single resourceful private carry an entire platoon forward, and in another instance a company. But many platoons do not have a star performer. They are the ones which get pinned down every time fire is encountered.

In an infantry regiment there are twenty-seven rifle platoons; in a division, eighty-one. It takes a considerable

amount of time to effectively train this number in a few basic plays even when the training is intelligently prepared and executed. Since the rifle platoon is the basic fighting unit of a division, all tactical training should be centered first on developing smart, smooth-functioning and hard-hitting teams.

A rifle platoon need know only eight plays, but it must know them so well that fog, smoke, darkness, fear, or confusion of battle cannot prevent their smooth execution. In starting, much training time can be saved by the use of demonstrations. Each of eight platoons within the regiment or division can be first perfected in one play and demonstrate it, not once, but several times to all of the other platoons. An instructor with a loudspeaker can point out and explain the reason for each detail of troop-leading and technique as the demonstration proceeds.

At this point let me list what I consider to be the eight basic plays for a rifle platoon:

**(1) The approach march.** Formations; actions of scouts; distances and intervals; signals; direction and change of direction; locations of leaders.

**(2) Actions when scouts are fired upon.** Actions of the scouts; the platoon leader; the platoon sergeant; the squad leaders; and the squads.

**(3) Building up on the scouts.** A part or all of the platoon, depending upon the platoon leader's plan. The detailed technique of execution. Positions and duties of leaders.

**(4) The fire fight (fire and movement).** Action of the holding attack or base of fire, as it has been called. Action of maneuver element whether it be (a) all of the platoon less scouts; (b) two squads; (c) one squad; (d) an automatic rifleman and one or two riflemen. Coordinating the two attacks; locations and duties of all leaders and the exact techniques for carrying out the plan.

**(5) The assault and reorganization.** Exactly how accomplished, with every detail of execution.

**(6) The platoon as the advance party.**

**(7) The platoon in defense.**

**(8) The platoon in withdrawal.**

Older officers will recognize these plays as coming from *Combat Principles of the Rifle Platoon*, published some years ago. I have always thought this a more specific and consequently a better and more realistic manual on the subject than later publications. It told the inexperienced officer and noncommissioned officer just what he needed to know. It described exactly the team

plays and the detailed techniques for their exact execution. Once the platoon leader and his platoon have been thoroughly drilled in these plays, on varied terrain, he will have a sound basis of tactical know-how from which to vary the plays to meet changed conditions.

Now how does a first-class football coach go about teaching team plays? If he is a Knute Rockne he is a perfectionist. He has a blackboard and uses it. He explains the situation and the play in great detail, what each man is to do and how he is to do it. Then he has the team try it out, perhaps the first time in slow motion. The coach points out the errors and the team runs through the play again, and again, and yet again until it is executed not only without errors, but with perfect timing and coordination. No secrets, no surprises. The testing comes in scrimmage. The equivalent to scrimmage for the platoon is the combat range. The secret of success is standardization of plays and repetition of each play until perfection of each detail is attained. Of course marksmanship and the mechanics of combat formations must precede tactical training. Target designation, fire control, and fire discipline, in short the collective fire of the fire unit—the platoon—should be taught and repeatedly practiced concurrently with the mechanics of combat formations. Control, maneuver, fire control, and fire discipline must become instinctive. Each play may be run through against an outlined or represented enemy when the instructor believes details have been mastered.

During 1943 I was present when a corps team was giving a final test to an infantry battalion. At the critique the battalion was found deficient in the use of fire-and-movement. It developed that none of the platoon leaders, nor any of the testing team, for that matter, knew the techniques used by a platoon leader to advance his unit by rushes of elements, by infiltration, or by maneuver of a subordinate element, while covered by the fire of the remainder. They had all heard of it and no doubt had seen demonstrations of it at The Infantry School, but they had never practiced it and were at a complete loss as to just how fire-and-movement was accomplished. Our training manuals used to describe this play in great detail; what commands or signals were given, how the rushes were made, who fired and who did not, and the like. But the training manual then current discussed fire-and-movement in general terms only, and for some reason most of the details of execution had been omitted.

**N**OW a few words as to combat practice firing. To most soldiers in combat for the first time the most surprising and disconcerting thing is that while the enemy is firing at them they can not see anything to fire back at. The enemy is not showing his head and shoulders in nice even rows like the silhouette targets did on the combat range. Having experienced this phenomenon myself in the First World War, in training a battalion in 1940 and 1941 I stressed (as much as the vast amount of time wasted on less important subjects would permit) target designation, fire distribution, fire control and fire discipline. On the combat practice range an enemy rifle-platoon position was laid out with silhouette targets; but the targets were not set out in a straight line in the open. Within a logical platoon position each target was placed behind the cover that a trained soldier so disposed would use. Leaders were likewise placed behind cover and in their correct positions. The result was that none of the "enemy" could be seen at even two hundred yards. But had each been a soldier he would have been under the control of his leader and able to fire his weapon effectively.

Platoons were warned they would have to rely on range estimation, target designation and fire distribution to get hits. The line of departure was about 700 yards from the enemy. The platoon leader could cause his scouts to open fire when they saw any of the enemy, or when the enemy opened fire, as indicated by a man in a pit firing several rounds.

The first time each platoon ran through the problem, using plays 1 to 5, surprisingly few hits were registered on the targets, but when the leaders and the men became convinced that there was something to this target designation, fire distribution, fire-control business the number of hits increased to an astonishing and gratifying degree.

**I**N my opinion this is the answer to much of the discussion as to why men did not use their rifles in combat. They could not see anything to shoot at and their own and their leader's training in what used to be known as musketry had been most inadequate. The so-called transition courses were more individual training and in no sense a substitute for team training in combined fire power.

In the past two wars our emphasis has been misplaced. We must teach thorough small-unit teamwork. It is used every day and all day, and in the end it contributes a major share to the outcome.

It is almost certain that in the future our Army, with perhaps only a small percentage battle-experienced, will from the very start have to stand up to and operate against the massed formations of Eastern Europe and Asia. Only when the proper emphasis has been given to developing very highly skilled tactical units; only when we can oppose vast masses with the superior comparative intelligence, resourcefulness and tactical skill of our junior leaders and our tactical teams, will we be able to adequately preserve our manpower and oppose the Communist levies on equal or superior terms.

*Individual training must come first, to be sure, but the emphasis must be on small-unit teamwork, practiced endlessly, day after day.*





# FRONT and CENTER

## Big Job

The requirements for membership on the Citizens Advisory Commission on Manpower Utilization were high: "the finest brains available—men of initiative, bold thought, careful planning and wide experience"—and for that reason Mr. Lovett was cautious in selecting members. By the first of November two of the civilian members had been selected: Gen. David Sarnoff, USAR-retired, who will serve as chairman, and the Rev. John C. Cavanaugh, former President of Notre Dame. The Commission is also to have a retired regular officer from each of the services; these officers are: Maj. Gen. John B. Anderson, USA; Adm. John H. Hoover, USN; and Maj. Gen. Merritt B. Edson, USMC. The retired Air Force officer had not been named by 1 November.

The job of the Commission is to "make a comprehensive and thorough study of the entire problem of the utilization of manpower by the Armed Services."

Its recommendations "shall be designed to accomplish the most economical use of manpower in the Armed Forces, without diminishing their combat capabilities."

A big job—as all soldiers know.

To help the Commission each service has appointed a liaison officer to work with it. The Army member is Brig. Gen. Herbert B. Powell; Navy: Capt. Henry C. Bruton; Air Force: Maj. Gen. Roger Browne; and Marine Corps: Col. Cliff Atkinson, Jr.

Maj. Gen. Merrill B. Twining, USMC, is Military Staff Director of the Commission.

The Commission will make continuing reports and recommendations as it proceeds, rather than a full report at the end of its labors.

## Another Commission

Still another civilian commission was at work. This one on "Incentive-Hazardous Duty and Special Pays" is headed by Lewis L. Strauss.

Its job is to make a detailed study of incentive and special pays in the military services, Coast Guard, Public Health Service, and Coast and Geodetic Survey.

It is expected that the Commission will make its report before the first of the year so that Mr. Lovett may send its recommendations to the Senate Armed Services Committee soon after the first of the year.

The establishment of the commission was suggested by that Committee. It is expected that much of its work will be based on the exhaustive studies the Hook Commission made a few years ago.

## Motor Pools Standardized

The Chief of Transportation, who has been given responsibility for all administrative transportation used in Army motor

pools, has established a model motor pool at the Transportation Center, Fort Eustis, Va.

The model motor pool will consist of a super service station, production line maintenance shop, central dispatch office and approximately 40,000 square yards of parking space. These facilities, besides serving the post with motor transportation, will be used to demonstrate the benefits to be derived from streamlined dispatching and preventive maintenance.

A course of instruction for supervisors of administrative motor pools is in the works. It will be operated by the Highway Unit Training Center and the Transportation School. This course will cover such subjects as: motor pool management, principles of vehicles utilization, sound operating practices, simplified maintenance procedure, shop facilities and equipment production line maintenance and vehicles and parts supply. It is planned that trained supervisors completing this course will return to their organizations equipped to establish better motor pool procedures and to provide courses of their own to perpetuate the program.


## Mr. Brown Retires

Mr. A. Stanley Brown, Treasurer of the U. S. Infantry Association and the Association of the U. S. Army since 1919, retired on 31 October.

While it can be said that Mr. Brown served under many editors, it would be more accurate to say that they all really served an apprenticeship in business under him. His close attention to all business details and his loyalty to the Association made him a reliable and valued adviser.

He came to the Infantry Association in 1919 from the War Department where he had served during the war years. During his long career at the JOURNAL he came to know many Army officers and when he completed thirty years of service the Executive Council gave him a unanimous vote of thanks and appreciation for his loyalty and devotion.

Mr. Brown will continue to make his home in Washington but anticipates many pleasant vacations on a Florida beach which he has long known and loved.



## Arctic Air Bases—Built by Paul Bunyans


When it can be told, the full story of how Army engineers built air bases in the Arctic wilderness will be in the Paul Bunyan mould—a story of fabulous concepts and tremendous daring, of battles against the elements at their worst. So far only the bare outlines of the story have been told. The first men flew in in helicopters. Heavy equipment was air-dropped. A runway for cargo aircraft was created by shoving snow off the ice of an Arctic lake. There were tremendous battles against the wind which drifted the snow back on runways as fast as snow machinery could remove it. To get frozen gravel from the moraine, the engineers had to resort to the methods of quarry-men who blast stone. High carbon steels in cutting edges and track plates would break and the job of keeping equipment in working condition was continually harassing. Welders worked outdoors in minus 40 degrees temperature. But the job was done.

## THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL

### Communications Made Easy

The Communications Department has established a "VIP" room where students and important visitors get a clear, simple introduction to the new family of FM radios. In a room full of training aids for illustrated conferences and orientation, communications are presented in laymen's language and new radios explained by comparing them with the sets they replace.

The aim is to make it easy for the un-



Artillery set SCR-619 (left) and its replacement the AN/PRC-9 (right)

initiated to assimilate new methods of communication. The system gives students and VIPs a background in the frequency spectrum of Army radios and the Army-Navy nomenclature system. Charts graphically representing these two subjects are designed with appropriate colors depicting the different arms.

A typical class is opened by discussing the frequency spectrum of the arms. A chart (see cut) shows the range and the number of operating channels. The infantry band and a new band common to all arms is explained in detail since their purpose requires more emphasis.

Overlapping frequencies between arms are pointed out to show the capability of one arm to communicate with another on its normal band and on the common band. For example, armor has 10 channels overlapping with artillery and artillery has 10 channels that overlap with infantry.

To explain the Army-Navy nomenclature system the AN/PRC-8, 9, and 10—

"Walkie-Talkie"—is used. This is a new series that replaces particular sets in armor, artillery, and infantry. This 26-pound AN/PRC series takes the place of the 55-pound SCR-510 used by armor, the 55-pound SCR-610, the 53-pound SCR-619 used by artillery, and the 36-pound SCR-300 used by infantry.

The origin of the nomenclature is explained so that the class understands the meaning of the letters and numbers used: For example, AN/PRC-9. AN stands for Army-Navy; the first letter following the slash denotes the type of installation or where the set will be found (P—pack or portable); the second letter represents the type of equipment (R—radio); the third letter shows the purpose of the set (C—communication); the number represents the model of that particular set. The model numbers describe the frequency range, indicating what arm can use the set. Number 8 denotes the lowest frequency range and the smallest number of channels—the armor set; 9 represents the next higher frequency range and the middle number of channels—the artillery set; 10 denotes the highest range and the largest number of channels—the infantry set.

A student can grasp the uses of an entire series by using only one radio in the series since the only difference between models in a particular series is in the frequency range. The new AN/GRC series is discussed briefly, showing how any communication requirement can be met by interchanging the component parts of a basic set within this series.

This method of introducing and familiarizing students and visitors with radio communication equipment permits instructors to discuss each model without repeated reference to the frequency range and nomenclature system. The use of non-technical terms helps those who have not kept up with developments in communications.

### New Field Manuals

FM 21-13, *The Soldier's Guide*, written at The Artillery School, is an easily understood manual designed to help the recruit adjust himself to Army life. It acquaints soldier and civilian alike with the

history, achievements, and organization of the Army, describes the code of the soldier, his responsibilities, and the advantages of military service. It defines duties and training such as drill, health, marches, combat training map and photo interpretation, and defense against atomic, biological, and chemical attack, and explains the weapons used by the combat soldier. *The Soldier's Guide* has been issued to organizations authorized field manual distribution, and may be purchased for 55¢ directly from the Superintendent of Documents.

**FM-6-75, 105mm Howitzer, M2 Series, Towed**, is the first of a series of revised service of the gun manuals written at TAS. In the revised editions, the familiar term "service of the piece" is eliminated in preference to the more descriptive artillery term "service of the gun." The revision describes in detail the latest techniques, the four methods of bore sighting, setting a precedent whereby bore sighting will be covered henceforth in service of the gun manuals instead of in FM 6-140, *The Firing Battery*.

Other features not found in service of the piece manuals but incorporated in the new service of the gun manuals are more illustrations, basic periodic tests, and presentation by charts of the individual duties of the cannoneers. The chart, as opposed to the list, was devised as a method of describing cannoneers' duties so that each man in the gun section could better understand his duties in relation to those of others in the section.

### Close-Defense Class

A two-hour class devoted entirely to the ramifications of close battery defense has been included in the program of instruction for Advanced, Battery Officer, and Officer Candidate courses at TAS. The instruction covers both the active and passive measures available for field artillery defense against air, counterbattery, or ground attack while in bivouac, position area, or on the move.

Although it is not the mission of the field artillery to close with the enemy, artillery units have had to engage in such action, so stress is placed on the need for training in infantry small-unit tactics. The necessity of unit SOPs covering all types of hostile attack is emphasized, including the use of a semipermanent security platoon within the artillery unit.

### Weapons Film

A new 35mm technicolor film bulletin was recently previewed at TAS. Filmed at Fort Sill earlier this year, FB 253, *Weapons of the Artillery* is based on the Department of Materiel's Mat 102, which is presented to students to demonstrate the characteristics and capabilities of weapons.

The artillery's new 280mm gun will be included in this movie before its release in 16mm size to other service schools and Army Reserve and National Guard installations.




Chart shows the frequency range of FM radios of different arms

# Irons in the Fire



Engineers' aluminum bridge

## Aluminum Bridge

Army engineers working with the Aluminum Company of America and the Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co. have come up with a new lightweight aluminum bridge, officially tagged the T-6. It can be erected faster than any other heavy tactical bridge. It is wider and can support about fifty percent greater loads than comparable World War II structures. The T-6 is normally considered a division-type bridge but with slight modification it becomes the T-7, army-type. Spanning approximately 180 feet, the T-6 can be manually erected in about one-third the time required for the same length as the old Bailey bridge.

## New 4.2-inch Mortar

The new M30 4.2-inch mortar has a rifled bore, is muzzle loaded, and lobbs projectiles 6,000 yards or so. The first model had an inner baseplate and an outer baseplate ring. Later ones have a one-piece baseplate. Other components include rotator, bridge, standard, and barrel. All are rigidly joined and all absorb some of the shock of the recoil, an unusual feature. In the M30, we have traded almost double the World War II weight for greater range, better accuracy and stability and 360-degree traverse without moving the baseplate.

## Revolving Monster

The XH-17, the world's largest known helicopter has made its first test flight. Built by Hughes Aircraft Co., for the Air Force, the XH-17 is an experimental heavy-lift machine expected to lift and deliver such heavy equipment as artillery, bridge sections and trucks in areas inaccessible to conventional aircraft. Rotor blades on the XH-17 extend over 125 feet from tip to tip; overall height of the giant 'copter is more than thirty feet. It is powered by two modified General Electric turbo jets supplying gas pressure through ducts leading up the rotor shaft and out to the tips of the rotor blades. The XH-17 handles its cargo on the same principle as a lumber lifter and the width of cargo space is about equal to two standard automobiles parked side by side.

## Dangerous Dipstick

The oil level indicator gage—the dipstick of the GMC H135 2½-ton truck is so located that when it is withdrawn from its well it is easy for its circular handle to touch the positive terminal of the battery while the other end of the dipstick is in the well. A short circuit can result—severely injuring the mechanic or driver and possibly damaging engine parts.

To avoid this type of accident the Department of Motors, The Artillery School, offers the following preventive measures:

While withdrawing the dipstick, cover the handle with the hand, or cover the positive terminal of the battery with the hand. The hand will act as insulation and will prevent the dipstick touching the battery terminal, and the short cannot occur. It is also possible to bend the dipstick or the well slightly away from the battery as it is withdrawn. Recommendations for changing the location of the battery or the dipstick well, or for placing a guard around the positive terminal of the battery are in the works.

## NATO Standardizations

The U.S. Army M1 rifle has been selected as the standard infantry weapon for all troops of the nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Other standardizations include: Britain's 50-ton Centurion tank, France's 81mm mortar, and the U.S. 155mm howitzer.

## Flying Trailer

Fairchild Aircraft's latest contribution to the field of transportation is a variation of the XC-120 "detachable-pod" plane in the form of a trailer which is a detachable cargo compartment for the plane. In flight, the new trailer will carry as much cargo as the original pod and upon landing, the trailer is detached and can be hitched to almost any military vehicle and hauled wherever needed. Fine maneuverability and high-speed over-the-road characteristics enhance its value in air-supplying ground operations. With one eye on civilian use, Fairchild engineers have designed the trailer so that it can be loaded at a warehouse or freight dock. Cargo-loading features include the ability to admit freight from both front and rear through wide, double-folding doors. The floor, located at standard truck bed height, is fabricated of extruded magnesium channels which provide strong and durable decking. During flight, wheel assemblies, which include shock absorbers and standard truck-type wheels and tires are removed and stowed aboard the trailer.



Top: Fairchild Sky Trailer resembles windowless trailer on highway; middle: hoisting it into position under the XC-120; bottom: aloft.

COMBAT FORCES JOURNAL



# ★ BOOK REVIEWS ★

## ADMIRAL KING'S RECORD

**FLEET ADMIRAL KING: A NAVAL RECORD.** By Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, U. S. Navy, and Commander Walter Muir Whitehill, U.S.N.R. W. W. Norton & Company. 674 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$6.75.

This collaborative work grew out of Admiral King's desire to augment the story of naval operations as told in his three wartime reports and Commander Whitehill's desire to write a biography of his former chief. Unlike Secretary of War Stimson, Admiral King kept no diary. He did not begin to set down recollections until after his relief as Chief of Naval Operations in December 1945. And this biography is the result of a novel method of working. Admiral King assembled voluminous notes on his own recollection of what occurred and why. These were checked against the memory of officers who served with him and against official documents. Whitehill went about preparing the biography as if his subject "was no longer living." Then, by frequent consultations and endless correspondence, their two accounts were woven into one. The result is a solid book that throws much light on Allied leadership in World War II. It ranks with Sherwood's *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Stimson's *On Active Service*, Admiral Leahy's *I Was There*, and Arnold's *Global Mission*.

Commander Whitehill was well advised to devote the first half of the book to Admiral King's training and naval service up to 1941, for this service underlay all his wartime decisions. There is a consistency and uniformity about Admiral King's career. He was a taut ship man as a line officer and an efficient administrator as a staff officer, and his standards of performance were high. No one who had anything to do with Admiral King had any illusions about his mental and physical toughness, but as this account shows, he did not shave with a blowtorch—as was commonly believed—and he did not trim his toenails with a net cutter!

The range of King's naval experience was unusually broad. Besides normal assignments as a junior officer, he taught at the Naval Academy and the Postgraduate School and edited the U. S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*. And in order to learn first hand about logistics, he accepted command of a supply ship. Later he headed the submarine base at New London and raised two sunken submarines. He took pilot training when he enjoyed the rank of captain, and commanded in turn a patrol plane unit, a carrier, and a carrier force. He reached the big league in 1933 when he became Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics. From this post he went to the General Board and to the command of the

Atlantic Fleet in 1940. King was one of the few "triple threat men" in the Navy with detailed knowledge of surface, underwater and air forces.

When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, King was trying hard to make bricks without straw in the Atlantic. To say that he was surprised when the President summoned him to Washington and made him Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet would hardly be true. King knew he was among the best officers in the fleet. Roosevelt solved the age-long division of authority between the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations by combining these offices under King in March 1942.

Admiral King had taken part in Fleet Problem XIX which showed how vulnerable Pearl Harbor was to a carrier attack conducted under the cover of a weather front. Because the Army was charged with the protection of the fleet in its base at Oahu, King did not think that Stark and Kimmel were as much responsible for the disaster as Marshall and Short.

As Navy representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, King thought the JCS made any unification of command in Washington unnecessary. He opposed the appointment of a Presidential Chief of Staff even when it was Admiral Leahy. His postwar advice was simply to continue the Joint Chiefs of Staff. King approved the decision of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff that Germany should be struck down first, but he constantly urged



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## WINCHESTER

THE GUN THAT WON THE WEST

BY HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON

*Winchester: The Gun That Won the West* is a big book, beautifully bound, lavishly illustrated—a book you'll gladly give a place of honor in your own library, or proudly and confidently send as a gift.

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- A complete, accurate history of the Winchester Repeating Arms Company...
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that enough pressure be applied to Japan to prevent her from consolidating her gains in the Pacific. His basic ideas on strategy were evolved from a study of the manpower and armament capacities of the Allied coalition. For that reason he was interested in keeping China in the war in the hope of utilizing her immense manpower resources against Japan. In view of what we now know of Japan's situation after Midway and Guadalcanal, it is a little surprising to learn that Admiral King thought she was capable of resuming the offensive in the Pacific long after she had given up any such plans.

As the readers of Stimson's memoirs know, a controversy of considerable intensity raged over the problem of who should command the Army Air Force planes engaged in antisubmarine operations. King's attitude was that the *function* involved should determine command. The Army and the Air Force attitude was that the *weapon* should determine command. This impasse was only solved through the withdrawal of the Air Force from antisubmarine operations in September 1943. Stimson's attitude convinced King's staff that "this great man and wise statesman . . . regarded the military mind as immature and addicted to petty wrangles. . . . He [Stimson] lived in an ivory tower high on the slopes of Olympus, as befitted an elder statesman and his voice was as the mutter of distant thunder."

The claim is also made by Admiral King that General Marshall "could not be impressed with the significance of the Marianas," which provided a base for our B-29s against Japan, and that it took a year of discussion for Arnold to see that they offered a better base than fields in China. This observation should be weighed against the Army commitments in the Southwest Pacific and General MacArthur's insistence on the southern route of advance. King and the Navy were convinced that the proper route of advance was in the Central Pacific and that Formosa and China were more promising areas in which to defeat the Japanese than the Philippines.

No naval officer in modern times has had so much power concentrated in his hands as did Admiral King from 1941-45. Yet this biography is strangely silent on his inability or unwillingness to force the Bureau of Ordnance to do anything effective about the faulty exploder on our torpedoes which made the lives of our submarine commanders in the Pacific a nightmare for the first two years of the war (Theodore Roscoe, *Submarine Operations in World War II*). In other matters King demanded a high standard of performance and generally got it.

When Nimitz, in response to a request as to how the flag officers in the Pacific Fleet were doing, made the conventional reply that they were all doing well, King gently observed that some must be doing better than others and the latter should be

called upon for improvement. He felt that Admiral Spruance's conduct of operations in the Marianas was a model of efficiency. Unlike Halsey at Leyte Gulf, Spruance did not allow his desire to defeat the Japanese surface force to draw him away from his responsibility for protecting the landing force. He managed to achieve both.

Admiral King attributes the surprise caused by Admiral Kurita's breakthrough in San Bernardino Strait on October 25, 1944, and the losses suffered by the Seventh Fleet, to Admiral Kinkaid's failure to conduct air searches after Kurita's turning movement as well as to Halsey's northward rush after Ozawa's decoy force.

King's major difference of opinion with Marshall and Stimson was over invading the Japanese mainland. At a relatively early stage in the war he concluded that Japan could be defeated by sea and air power without the necessity of an invasion. He reluctantly acquiesced in the decision to invade Kyushu and Honshu. In the light of afterknowledge it appears that King was right, but in the summer of 1945 no one could guarantee that Japan would surrender even in the face of the atomic bomb and Russian intervention.

It is a misfortune that Admiral King's difficulties with Secretary Forrestal clouded his last days in office. King seems to have been an unyielding advocate of the Navy's position in all matters relating to the war, but he showed a determination to make the Joint Chiefs system work. His much criticized attitude on release of news about the Navy was not based upon a desire to keep the public in the dark, but on a refusal to give useful information to the enemy. At a time when the public is being bewildered by the variety and contradictory character of statements issued by defense officials, it would be in the national interest to have a few men around as reticent as Admiral King! This is an important book and should be widely read by servicemen of all branches.—H. A. DEWEERD.

#### FRENCH OBSERVER IN WASHINGTON, 1865

**IMPRESSIONS OF LINCOLN AND THE CIVIL WAR. A Foreigner's Account.** By the Marquis Adolphe de Chambrun. Translated from the French by General Aldebert de Chambrun. Random House. 185 Pages; \$2.75.

Marquis Adolphe de Chambrun, a friend of de Tocqueville and wed to La Fayette's granddaughter, heartily disapproved of Napoleon III and his usurpation of authority. He therefore decided to seek a career in the United States, although it meant temporary separation from his wife with whom he was deeply in love. To that circumstance we are indebted for these letters written during the first six months of 1865 in the best tradition of the epistolary art.

The young French nobleman sailed on an unofficial mission to this country in December 1864. The name of La Fayette and letters of introduction to American

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leaders gave him an entrée everywhere including the White House. These contacts with President and Mrs. Lincoln, and many others, afforded an opportunity of weighing character and personality, of observing events closely in the final stages of the military campaigns of the Civil War. In turn a rare gift of analysis and expression makes these letters a genuine contribution to our history. That these letters were found a few years ago by General de Chambrun, the writer's son, and translated by him, is most fortunate.

Not the least of the enjoyment of reading these letters will be the incidental intelligence about our country in 1865. American cooking and the railroad journey from New York to Washington have certainly improved. Other things are unchanged. Whisky, "a liquor horribly popular here in America" has lost little of its allure. Speaking of politics, he wrote his wife that Vice President Johnson "is a Tennessean carried away by ambition. He has become what over here is called a politician, which in Europe corresponds practically to a demagogue. The American politician is almost the reverse of a statesman." If the Marquis could see the recent political campaign, he might not feel the need of changing his mind.

On the other hand he wrote that "Lincoln has nothing in common with the politicians who follow popular caprice." His detailed portrait of Lincoln shows instant appreciation of the President's unique qualities. How extraordinary that a foreigner and an aristocrat eulogized Lincoln before most of his fellow citizens realized the full measure of the man!

Americans will also delight to read a foreigner's observation on the war and the military leaders. This is how he sized up the contestants in 1865. "On the Northern side, great enthusiasm, enormous energy, and an obstinate will to go forward prevails, no matter what sacrifices may ensue. On the Southern, we cannot but admire an incomparable force of resistance. Broken, beaten down to earth, without arms and without credit, a handful of ruined men struggle on with fanatical fury and patrician pride. The very moment they seem lost, they rise up as though moved by an electric spark. Strange phenomenon this indomitable courage which nothing can shatter and which the greatest misfortune cannot bow down."

To this homage to the American people on both sides in this internecine struggle there is space to add only one more example of his perception. Concerning Sherman's last campaign he writes: "I, who try to observe events impartially, cannot doubt that, at this very moment, he is writing one of the most brilliant pages in Military history."

There is only one reason for regret in reading these fascinating letters. What a pity the Marquis did not reach this country long before January, 1865.—BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG.

#### WEYGAND'S MEMOIRS

**RECALLED TO SERVICE.** The Memoirs of General Maxime Weygand of the Académie Française. Translated by E. W. Dicks. Doubleday & Co., Inc. Illustrated; Index; 454 Pages; \$6.75.

Towards the end of his life, Marshal Foch evidently had some misgivings about the future security of France. But he had unlimited confidence in his former chief of staff, General Maxime Weygand, so he gave the French people the best advice he could think of: "call Weygand if trouble comes."

Trouble came in the summer of 1939 and Weygand's seventy-two years were no barrier to his country's call. In these memoirs of the three years that followed, Weygand begins with his military-diplomatic mission of coordinating Allied forces in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. But in May 1940, Weygand's talents were needed far more urgently at home. Faced with an unparalleled disaster, the French government in desperation looked to Weygand to handle the legacy of Gamelin's defeat. The new commander of the Allied forces looked things over. His estimate of the situation and his solution are a valuable contribution to military history, although the details have been described many times before. In a few weeks it was clear that the Allied forces were irreparably and hopelessly beaten. Weygand told Reynaud that an armistice was the only way out.

Here begins the most controversial period in Weygand's life, and future historians will have to reckon with what is written in these memoirs. Weygand has suffered bitter denunciation for his role in the defeat of France and for recommending an armistice in June, 1940. He has been charged with being anti-British, a defeatist and a collaborationist. His memoirs show that he was merely pro-French and a realist.

He ignores his accusers. His memoirs are calmly dispassionate, almost disappointingly so. He writes with amazing restraint and objectivity. He cites chapter and verse from the records to pile up convincing evidence that he regarded the armistice as a temporary but absolutely necessary haven, but not the end of the voyage. He acknowledged the ineluctable loss of a battle, but not the war. Weygand's documented and closely reasoned arguments for opposing the Reynaud-de Gaulle project for transferring the Government and the war to North Africa are persuasive and convincing.

In the light of subsequent events, we must today agree with the soundness of these views. Had the French tried to fight in 1940, Hitler would inevitably have occupied that region too, with serious consequences to our future war efforts.

After a brief period in the Vichy government, Weygand, who is obviously no politician, was sent to Africa as sort of proconsul for all the French colonies. His relations with Petain, Darlan and Laval

are an illuminative commentary on these men and on French policy toward Germany. Undoubtedly this portion of the book will be the most important as an historical document of the era. Petain emerges from these pages as an unsullied patriot. On the other hand, the appeasers and the collaborationists and the misguided Free French, under de Gaulle, are depicted as harmful to the true interests of France. Laval and Darlan are treated with close adherence to the "*de mortuis nil nisi bonum*" principle, but there is little doubt where Weygand stood in his relations with these two.

The proconsul was too much for Hitler to endure, so he was finally retired to the Riviera as a result of German pressure on the Petain government. He was seized by the Gestapo when the Nazis occupied all of France, and imprisoned in a German fortress. And there finally, Hitler had his revenge on the man who had accompanied Foch to the signing of the 1918 Armistice.

Weygand's place in history was already secure. These memoirs add to his stature as a great soldier and statesman when France sorely needed his services. The tragic fall of France is an object lesson of great importance to the American soldier, as are efforts of that nation to rehabilitate itself after defeat. General Weygand's memoirs offer the best available opportunity of examining both these phases of French history.—BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD ARMSTRONG.

#### BOOKS RECEIVED

**A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF CHINESE COMMUNISM.** By Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank. Harvard University Press. 552 Pages; Index; \$7.50.

**THE MAGIC CARPET.** By Shlomo Barer. Harper & Brothers. 243 Pages; Illustrated; \$3.50. The story of the migration of the Yemenite Jews from Libya to Israel.

**STEPPING STONES TO THE SOUTH POLE.** By J. R. Nichol. Library Publishers. 199 Pages; Illustrated; Index; \$3.75. The story of the quest for the South Pole.


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